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Sixty hospitalized male and female alcoholics were 
given the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (1964) 
upon admisslon to an in-patient alcohol treatment program 
and just prior to discharge. 
Scores were eliot ted from the questionna.ire -to measure \, 
three aspects of risk taking in decision making: 1) Prob­
a~11ities or odds of success, 2) tolerance of ambiguity, and 
3) preference for sure bets. 
Risk data was related to attendance at out-patient 
clinics after discharge from the program. Analysis of data 
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was conducted by dividing the sample into two groups def1ned 
'by attendance at the out-patient clinics. 
It was hypothesized that subjects attending the out- \ 
patient clinics would show larger cha~ges in the direction 
of increased risk taking between pre and post-program test- ' 
lng conditions, and that their scores would be lower 
numerically, indicating a greater willingness to take risks. 
Change in the direction of increased risk taking was 
found to be the major predictor of attendance at the out­
patient c11nics. Absolute willingness to risk, as measured 
by the questionnaire was not found to be significantly dif­
ferent between the two groups. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many psychotherapists feel that the capacity to risk 
1s a necessary ingredient for change. Whether that change 
occur in a person seen in a professional context or 1n a 
person who views new behavior as being more rewarding, risk 
a~d change go hand in hand. Coleman (1972) described this 
relationsh1p in.the following way_ 
Life often poses problems in which the pursuit of 
increased satisfactions involves giving up present
hard-won security and taking new risks. For the 
neurotic, this is likely to prove an especially 
anxiety-arousing conflictful situation [p. 226]. 
Why snould this be true? It seems that one of the 
major ways we keep ourselves from risking is by requiring 
knowledge of what is' going to happen before we will try 
something new. Polster and Polster (1972) state: 
For most people the need to be able to predict the 
results of their actions prevents them from easily
I­ reaching beyond the existing forms of behavior where 
I the greatest opportunities are present. If they : I 
J 
,-
venture into unfamiliar territory, while they might 
gain an increased sense of excitement and power, . 
they· .might lose their easy understanding and feel 
unprepared and alien Cp. 1481. 
Another force which makes risking, for change, a dif­
ficult process is the fear of knowledge of oneself. Part of 
our energy is directed towards maintaining and protecting 
2 
our self-esteem. We tend to be afraid of information that 
m~y un~ermine our ideal image and use repressive defenses to 
,-void coming in contact w1th what are perceived as unpleas­
ant truths. 
Maslow (1968) argues that there are two ways of deal­
ing with the unknown. One is to move toward knowledge and 
increased understanding of oneself. This 1s the growth pro­
cessl by which one comes to know new aspects of himself and 
can decide whether or not the behavior or characteristic is 
positive. Another way of dealing with the unknown is by 
clinging to safety and defensiveness. Here the person hangs 
on to the past, afraid to jeopardize what he already has, 
thereby blindly supporting and defend1ng the old belief. 
Maslow (1968) describes the prpces8 of healthy growth 
as 
• • • a never ending series of free choice situa­
tions~ confronting each individual at every point
throughout his life, in which he must choose between 
the delights of safety and growth (p. 47]. 
Each or the situations Maslow,refers to requires a 
decision 1n which the adaptiveness of old 'behavior is 
~elghed against the risk of trying something new. In a 
therapeutic context, trying somethin~ new (change) involves 
learning ,and practicing new skills. Polstex' and Polster 
(1972) state: 
. 3 

A skill cannot be learned well until it is tried 
out. By trying it out, the individual loweps his 
t~reshold of risk. In fact, the whole therapy scene 
~s aimed at altering risk thresholQs through trying 
out in relatively safe situations what i5 prohibi­
tl'vely frightening in the world outside r p. 108l. 
, Another aspect of therapy is developing awareness or 
1nsight and here again we run into the need for risk taking. 
Enright (1971) describes new awareness as almost always fol­
lowing a sense of taking a chance: 
• • • of groping to say the unsayable or beginning
something without being sure of the ending. When 
th1s experience is not present, almost certainly the 
"Insight" being pI"esented 'is a sterile rehash rather 
than an expansion of awareness [p. 119). 
Risk taking seems to be an important aspect of healthy 
functioning and plays an integral part in changing maladap­
tive behaviors. Yet, even though these ideas are gener~lly 
accepted, the relationship between risk taking and healthy 
functioning, or change to healthier functioning, has been 
little tested empirically. 
The focus of the present study is to investigate some 
,of the relationships between' changes on an empirical measure 
pf risk taking and subsequent behavioral ,changes. The 
Kogan-Walla~h Choice Dilemmas Questionnai·re (l964) is used 
as the empirleal measur~ of risk and was given to hospltal­
lzed alcoholics before and after an in-patient hosp1tal 
treatment program. As a measure of behavioral change" 
~ttendance at out-patient clinics was chosen because 
4 
co~t~nued participation on an out-patient basis has been 
.rela~:ed to reduced drinking and increased functioning in 
I 
. othe~ areas of the alcoholic's life (Gerard and Saenger 
'1966),. A detailed discussion of the· attributes and limita­
tlons' of these variables will be presented later. 
The remainder of the Introduction will ~e devoted to 
deflning risk taking and discussing the present state of the 
art with reference to alcoholism. 
Definition of Risk Taking 
Researchers on risk taking do not look at the concept 
of ri~k from quite the same perspective as do the above 
cited therapist-s and theorists. Their thinking is remark­
ably less romantic. For some, the concept of risk was not a 
neceB~ary factor in predicting decision-making behavior. 
..
Edwards (1953), for example, proposed a group of 

models,whlch postulated that a decision maker will choose 

the alternative which will yield the maximum value for him. 

The declsio~ is based on a logical choice between the alter­

nat1ves available.: EmphaSis is placed o~ the quality of the 

alternatives and not on the characteristics of the Indivi­
dual. Therefore, if behavior can be pred1cted ~Y ignoring 

1ndlvi~ual differences or situs·tional circumstances, the 

concept of risk becomes irrelevant. 

5 
Experiments conducted by Edwards (1953, 1954a, 195~b 
~pd 1954c) anti Pruitt (1962) have demonstrated that decision 
~klhg based solely on max1m1z1ng expected value does not 
~~coijnt for ~ significant (30 to 45 ~er cent) portion of the 
variance. It can reasonably be assumed that other factors 
~. 
be~ldes logic and rationality, are involved in decision mak­
~ 
ing. T.herefore, the inclusion of risk as a factor in deci­
sion making seems justified. 
What are some of the factors of decision making 
involving risk? Certainly one of the first factors to con­
slder 1s the probability of achieving a su'ccessful outcome, 
i.e., the odds. It is commonly assumed that low odds, that 
Is, fewer chances of achieving a successful outcome, 1s 
characteristic of a risky decision. Therefore, based 
strictly on a consideration of the odds, decisions where the 
odds ~ere low would be made less frequently or at least more 
cautiously than deCisions where the odds were high. This 
would ~ertainly be true if the decision were to bet ten dol­
lars, where w1nning yielded a ten dollar gain and losing 
resulted in a ten dollar loss. If, however, the bet were 
ohanged such that the loss of the wager resulted in addi­
. 
tional p~nalt1es one might be -less willing to ac~ept the bet 
even though the odds were weighted toward a successful ·out­
come. 
I 
~ t 
: I ~n addition to odds, then, potential gains versus 
.c~stsl~onstitutes the second major factor in decision mak­
1~ ifYOlVing risk. G1ven identical odda, e.g., five in 
ten, ~ach of the following sets of gains versus eosts' may 
c*eatk qi!ferent decisionB whether to accept the risk or 
not: 
GAIN COST 
Miss,1ng a class. Missing a "pop" quiz. 
$10,000;00. Ten years in prison. 
An evening with a Feelings of rejection. 
n1ce person. 
A new Job, with more Failing at the new Job; 
money, prestige and. or, success with 
responsib1'lity. ulcers. 
Kogan and Wallach (1964) define risk in terms of two 
si~il~r concepts: lack of certainty and the prospect of 
10$s or failure. Neither of these two factors contributes 
.' ' 
eq~all~ to the general assessment of risk in decision mak­
in~,. Where odds may be critically important 1n a business 
I· ve~ture, the prospect of los~ or failure may be more impor­
tant in dec1ding whether or not to go sky diving for the 
rlrst time. Kogan and Wallach (1967) go on to define risk 
in the foll~w1ng way: 
To talk about risk taking, then, is to refer to 
behavior in situations where there is a desirable 
"goal and a lack of certainty' that 1 t can be 
atta1ned. The situations may take the form of 
tt 
7 
r~qulr1ng a choice between more and leas desir­
a'ble goals, with the former having a lower proba­
bl,l1ty of attainment than the latter. A further 
p'Qss1ble characteristic of ~uch situa·tions is the 
threat of negative consequences for failure, so 
that the individual at the post decisional state 
might find himself worse off than he was before he 
nia~e the decision (. p. 1151. . 
The above definition of r1sk, where "desirable goal" 
and "lack of certaintylt are major factors, cannot be applied 
tQ~ the situation of risk in many contexts without modifica­
tl:on. One characteristic of the def1nition is the implicit 
as\~utnption that the thing being risked is 1n the decision 
ma~er'f s awareness; that is, in terms of the above defini tion 
that the desirable goal is known. Take for example, the de­
cl~ion by an adolescent of whether or not to accept a bet 
1n~olving an illegal road race. In this situation the overt 
"del?.1rable goa~n is to win the race and therefore the bet. 
Frd~ a subjective level the desirable goal may be to accept 
the be~, live through t~e race, and most impo~tantly, avoid 
the potential of being thought of as a "chicken.tr From this 
subjective point of view the teen-ager may be taking less 
risk in racing than in declining. The degree of risk in 
this example seems to be a function of the individual '.s per­
cep.~i()n of what is at stake from both an objective and sub­
Jective ·point of view. 
The p~tential £or both objective and subjective los~ 
is npt s.trictly limited to the growing pains of adolescents. 
,..........
------------------~~~ 
\. ! 
I 
I 
1 I,8 
I
.1 ,J ;,Ah9t~'kr example may be helpful. Betty is a supervisor in a \ I 
.p~ori managed business. In this context she is called upon j 
y
.!
,t? lll~:re d~c1s1ons of importance disproportionate to her 
pc)ait·~~n. She is asked to work overtimej she Is not pa1d as 
I 
lmuch ts she needs nor is worth; and the working conditions, 
iboth fhYSicallY and emotionally, are terrible. She has been 
[aCti"lflY lookJ.rig for· a new Job and has been finally offered 
'Ianother position. The new job would be almost the exact 
It 
~I 
!re'ver~e of her present posit1on,:. She would receive more 
roneY1 responsibility would be well-defined, working condi­
t1pns~are excellent and the managerial staff has an excel-
I ~, ~eht ttepu,tation.· 
1
';W1ll she take the new Job? It seems likely if money J 
. itorkl1g conditions, and managerial structure are the major i 
I 
Ifactori~ 1n her emot1onal scheme of things. Yet there could 
, II . i: 
,be otti~r factors which would make moving to the other Job 
, I J-rls~ proposition. 
-,One thIng that Betty 'c'oul,d risk in moving· to the new 
~o~'1~'her sense of competence. In a poorly managed company 
Be~ty ~s clearly a competent and important person, at least 
in ~omparlson to the other staff. The risk involved in 
cha~gt9g jobs 1s in finding out whether 'that sense of com­
petence ~ill carry over to the new job. 
F,rom an existential standpoint the rl&ks for the teen­
age~.a~d.Be~ty ar~ straightforward and therefore significant. 
9 
The teen-ager is risking his fledgling conception of man­
"h~od. His decision may be based less on the maintenance of 
lIfe than on the maintenance of his conception of himself as.,. 
a man. For Betty the issue may be on~ of self-worth being 
correlated with competence. In the one Job her competence 
stands out, but the conditions are terrible and the rewards 
are few. Taking the new Job" holds the potential of proving 
that her competence was only relative to the incompetent 
staff surrounding her. 
The concept of tolerance of ambiguity (~renkel­
B~n8wik 1949) is congruent with both the eXistential view 
of r1sk described above and the meaning of rlsk implied by 
th~ therapists cited earlier. It also provides further sup­
por~ that decisions involving risk taking are influenced by 
subjective factors specific to the individual. Tolerance of 
ambigu~ty is conceptualized as an aspect of the personality 
which is capable of accepting conflicting data without a 
strong need to reconcile the differences immediately. The 
reverse J 1ntolerance of ambfgu i ty , is a ". • • preference 
for familiar1ty, symmetry, definiteness and regularity, 
. . 
• tend1ng toward black-white solutions (Frenkel- . 
Brunswik 1949, P.' 112) ." These tendencies are considered 
to be perceptual characteristics found in association with 
strong attitudes of prejudice and where repression is a 
d~lnant defense mechanism. A further characteristic of 
10 
1 1 
I • 
1nt91e~a~ce of ambiguity 1s the inab1l1ty to think 1n terms 
11 . 
"o~pr6b~~111tY and the avoidance of "uncertainty. An indi­
v~f:iual~t 1ntQlerant of amblgu1 ty seeks to make fact out of 
1 ~ 
c1rQumstances where fact is unclear so as to reduce the un­
kno~n taQto~s. In terms of r1sk tak1ng, an 1nd1v1dual who 
1s intolerant of ambigu1ty w1ll avoid s1tuations where the 
ou~pdme ts not certa1n o~ close to it. The Important point 
1s ~hat ~he .outcome 1s certain, not necessarily whether it 
1s $oOd: qr bad. 
Oth;er research (Mar.tin 1954, Smock 1955a)" has sug­
ges~ed ·th~t an in~1vidualts response to ambiguous perceptual 
slt\'istl:on,s may result from a specIfic organization of the 
per$on~llty wh1ch ~tructures situations lacking 1n certainty.
I 
The*efore', the individual who perceives the world from such 
\c 
a st:ructu,ring system will act to reduce incoming data to fit 
thetsystem rather than have a piece of information that is 
not ,copgI';lent with the structure". Placing data into the 
sy~tem acts to reduce ambiguity •. The quality of the outcome 
ma~ o,"maf not result 1n objectIve conclusion, as in the 
ca~~ 9t Pteju~iee. 
Ham~lt"on (1957) descrl,bes the process 1n the following 
way:; 
AVQld~nce or ambiguity as a princ1ple of, and ex­
p~esslon of cognitive control 1s found in assoc1a­
~lo~ with a relatively high degree of total 
~~letYJ but part1cularly where the princ1ple 
~rense mechanism adopted by the individual to 
11 
c6pe with anxiety and conflict is repression. This 
m~chanism leads the individual to deny reality 
ra~~er than acknowledge it. It becomes generalized 
tOf'~he perceptual field of operation, where by nega­
t$. methods of l1mIt1ng and restrIct1ng the Indl­
v."CalIS field of awareness and behavior, it tends to 
l~ a to the avoidance of responses which might result1n uncertainty and anxiety, on account of the degree 
ot perceptual conflict, equivocality and unstruc­
turedness inherent in such situations. By avoiding 
amb~guity, the Neurotic person, the Conversion 
Hysteric and Obsessional in particular, would appear 
to ~void both subjective uncertainty and conflict­
r~l situations. By avoiding uncertainty and con­
flict, the individual would appear to avoid further 
anx~ety (p.215). 
What I am proposing is that there are two major fac­
tors ~n de~ision making involving risk. The first is the 
overt data, such as odds and potent1al outcomes and rewards 
r 
that are measurable. The second factor is the potential 
outcome in terms of existential anxiety and tolerance of 
ambiguity. 
:·11) terms of the overt data, one looks at the s1 tuat10n 
in a ~ogical and rational manner. "Can I afford to lose ten 
dol~a~s by betting on a football game when I know my chances 
are about fifty-f1fty?tI In response the person might say, 
"Yes, .r have the money and would not feel any part1cular 
-, 
p~nch 'if I lose. I also usually enjoy watch1ng the game 
more i.r I have made a bet. II The odd~ are acceptable and the 
potential loss 1n terms of money 1s tolerable. 
ttn the second set of factors one is also logical, but 
from' all d1ff;erent set of assumptions. From the standpoint of 
12j 

1

eX1stertlal anxiety or tolerance of ambiguity, the question 
" i 
now be:comes, trCan I afford to lose ten dollars to that loud­
.mouth'ln 	the off1ce who I know will remind me for weeks that 
~ 
il 
I 10st!1 the bet?" Given this data the response mlght be dif­
ferentl~. For example, If That guy makes me so mad that if I 
lost the bet I would probably be upset dally by h1s gloating. 
Even- t~ough the bet 1s fa1r and I can afford the money, I '; 
cannotjafford to have him drive me crazy for the next month 
. 1 
if I lfse. Therefore I will not take the bet unless he will 
give m~. some points. Then the odds· would be enough in my 
i 
favor ~o risk my emotional well-being." The loss, from an 
j 
.e~isteptlal.point' of view, is seen in terms of reduction of 
A sel~-w~rth resulting from the continual reminders that the 
I 
bet wa;3 lost. The uncertainty of the situat.1on is apparently 
great ~nough'in terms of the potential loss to decide not to 
bet. $hat is, his tolerance of the ambiguous factors sur­
round~g·the bet is not high enough to accept the wager.
I. 	
'ow d~es·the above conceptualization of r~sk which 
1nCIUd~e odds, tolerance of ambiguity and both objective and 
• ~I • 
I ex~stejtial loss, fit with existing knowledge on alcoholism 
and a110holiCS? The following section will review the major 
approaqhes to alcoholism, and provide a basis for relating 
I
risk t~klng to alcoholism. 
13 

Alcoholism 
Since the beginning of recorded history alcohol has 
been used, and not infrequently abused by a wide variety of 

cultunes. In early societies alcohol was used for both food 
! 

: 1 
~nd ,dp1nk; for medicinal purposes, and as a method for I 
reaching a state of religious ecstasy. In modern societies 
alcehol is used primarily as a social catalyst and a mood 
eleva~or (MacAndrew and Edgerton 1969). 
'In spite of its continued use, alcOhol has been the 
targe~ of .frequent warnings against over-indulgence. Plato 
observed that alcohol releases in man much that has other­
wise Qeen kept dormant. In Rome, Valerius Maximus enforced 
a· stl'ict .prohibition against women drinking "lest thereby 
they f!lll into some disgrace rMcKinlay 1945, p. 14J. It 
~lassical scholar Arthur McKinlay (1945) reports that 
Pope Clement I warned 
• • • of the deadly association of wine and women; 

he, criticizes,wornen for reveling in luxurious riot, 

gulping down wine so as to make a show of themselves 

an~ hiccuping ostentatiously like men; he advises 

boys and girls to keep away from wine as an arouser 

of' the passions rpp. 14~151 . 

. In sixteenth century England, Thomas Nash (1592) 
. 
deli{leated more than one sort of drunkenness. "N'or haue we 
one or two kinde of drunkar'ds onely, but eight l(indes." He 
descrl-bes the nApe drunken who sings uand hollowes, and 
daunceth for the heauensH ; the IILion drunken who throws pots 
1.4 
about the house" ; the uSwine drunken who lays ulumpish and 
sleepleJ' ; the Sheepe drunke, wise in his owne conceipt when 
he cannot bring forth a r1ght word It ; the fifth 1s the tfMawd­
len drunke, a fe1lowe who will weepe for kindness in the 
midst of his ale"; the sixth is the "Martin drunke" who 
drinks himself sober; the next is the "Goat drunken whose 
mind turn.s to lechery; and finally there is the "Fox drunkeu 
who becomes more clever and crafty when drinking (p. 467). 
An American physician in the early nineteenth century 
described some of the symptoms of d·runkenness in a similar 
manner: 
Certain· extravagant acts which indicate a temporary
tit of madness. These are singing, halooingj roar­
ing, imitating the noises of brute animals, jumping, 
tearing of clothes, dancing naked, breaking glasses 
an~ china, and dashing other articles of householdi 
j rurniture upon the ground or floor (Rush 1811, p. 2). 
I 
I More recently the Anti-Saloon League described on aI 
I' poster ~n 1913 the potential disaster that can befall an 
I· individual who drinks: 
Alcohol inflames the passions, thus making the 
temptation to sex sin unusually strong. Alcohol 
de,creases the power of control, thus making the re­
sisting of temptation especially difficult. Avoid 
all alcoholic drink absolutely. The control of sex 
1mpu'lses will then be easy, 'and disease, dlshonor~ 
dtsgrace and degradation will be avoided. 
And finally from'C. Nelson Davis, Psychlatrist-1n­
ChIef of the Malvern Institute for Psychiatric and Alcoholic 
. 
I' 
Studies: urn alcoholism, the equation is simply expressed:I j. 
15 
Man 	plus alcohol equals psychopathic behavior. Man minus 
alcohol equals a normally disciplined person [Davis 1962, 
p. ll. tt 
In ~he face of the long and ene~getic history of cau­
·tton and social disapproval associated with the abuse of 
aleohol, one cannot help but wonder at the nature of a drug 
powe~ful enough to warrant risking the loss of family, work, 
social standing, etc. What then is the nature of alcohol­
ism? 
At present individuals who drink more than societal 
'standards dictate are called "alcoholics," "chronic alco­
ho11cs,rr "alcohol addicts," "addictive drinkers," and more 
recently "problem drinkers." The variety of different terms 
used to describe the same problem provides some insight into 
the divergence of theoretical orientations. 
~here is no universally accepted definition of alco­
holism, and many scholars contend that the term 
encompasses a wide range of pathologica~ behavior 
syndromes associated with alcohol use. In short, it 
xn1ght be more appropriate to speak of "alcoholisms" 
rather than alcoholism, since there are a number of 
distinct disorders whose major characteristic is the 
~a~hological seeking for and reaction to, the effects 
of 'alcohol '(:. Roebuck and Kessler 1972, p. 3). 
There is some common ground however. Certain aspects 
of alcoholism which are common to most theoretical formula­
tions include the following: 
1. 	 Self destruction of the alcohol abuser. 
2. 	 Interfer~nce with the individual's physical,
mental and/or social functioning or adjustment. 
.. 
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3.{ Exceed1ng the norms, dietary or social customs

qf the society in terms of quantity, frequency 

I and time and place of alcohol consumption.

4. 1 ~oss of control (i.e., the inability to stop 
qrlnking) t: Roebuck and lCessler 1972, p. 121. 

fecause of the diVerg~nce o~ t~eoretical orientations 
i 
and be~ause it is the most widely held, the World Health 
I . 
or~an1*at1on (1952) definition will be used: 
Al~0~01iCS are those excessive drinkers whose de­
pe~dence upon alcohol has attained such degree.. a 

th~t it shows a noticeable mental disturbance or 

aOllnterference with their bodily and mental 

he~lth, their interpersonal relations, their 

sm~oth social and economic functioning; or show 

tht prodromal signs of such development 1: p. 5). 

there are three major theoretical approaches which 
r , 
.attemp~ to des.crlbe the etiology and nature of alcoholism. 
A brief overview of these approaches 1s necessary to provide
I 
I 
an aderuate basis for later discussion. 
the first general. theoretical approach takes as its 
I 
bas1c premise that the cause of alcoholism 1s basically 
PhYS·iOiogtC8l.. This is the constitutional approach which 
1 
holds ~hat some physiological or structural defect produces 
a pre~+sPo~ition which yields addiction when the individual 
11s Int~oduced to alcohol. 
f 
Researchers in this area have had some success. For 
I 
examP11' the search for a genetiC base r'or alcoholism has 
prod~c~d supportive evidence (Kaij 1960, Partanan 1966, 
Eysenclt 1967, McClearn 1959, Rogers 1967), both with human 
and nO~human subjects. And there is also some evidence that 
~-------- ----~ _-_.- -----~-
17 

a blache~ical defect, which is an inherited metabolic de­
fect, r.esults in nutritional deficiencies (Williams, Pelton 
and Rogers 1951). Another area of investigation (Tintera 
1956) conceives of physiological alcoholism as a symptom of 
a glandular disorder. 
However, the research conducted in support of a con­
stitutional theory has produced neither consistent nor con­
clusive results. Lester (1966), for example, has criticized 
many of the constitutional studies on methodological 
grounds. And McCord, McCord and Gu~eman (1960), who con­
ducted the-only in-depth longitudinal study on alcoholism 
u~lng human belngs, concluded that nutritional defiCiencies, 
glandular disorders and hereditary factors are not signifi­
cant factors in the etiology of alcoholism. _ 
The se"cond major theoretical approach is based on the 
belief that an individual's psychological mechanisms and 
personalIty are the major causes of alcoholism. Several 
orientations have evolved from this approach. Six of these 
·orl~ntations will be discussed: alcohol effects, reinforce­
ment or learning theory, psychoanalysis, field dependence, 
alcoholic personality, and transactional analysis. 
The "alcohol effects" orientation 1s concerned with the 
ways in which alcohol affects the alcoholic and the reasons 
stated by the alcoholic for drinking. Evidence from Mulford 
and Miller (1960) supports the view that alcohol helps the 
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alcoholic to feel better about himself and to deal with 
others in a more constructive way. Kinsey (1966), however, 
found that alcoholics did not have a better self-concept 
after dr1nking, and Tamerin and Mendelson (1969) discovered 
that arter an initial euphoria, intoxication yielded feel­
lngs of guilt, remorse, self-deprecation and protracted cry­
lng spells. i 
'j 
Another psychological orientation toward alcoholism is 
in terms of reinforcement or learning theory. For these 
theorists, one develops a dr1nking problem because of the 
reinforcing effects of alcohol. For example~ 1n an un­
familiar social sett1ng someone who d1scovers that alcohol 
'reduces uncomfortable feelings will be more l1kely to drink 
alcohol in a similar future situation (Conger 1951; Dollard 
and Miller 1950). 
The psychoanalytic orientation 1s 1n terms of pass1v­
ity and regreSSion. Fenichal (1945) claims that alcoholics 
use the effects of alcohol rt ••• to sat1sfy the archaic 
oral long1ng which is a sexual longing, a ,need for security, 
and a need for the ,maintenance of self-est,eern simultaneously" 
(p. 376). Menninger (1963) views alcohol as symbolic of the 
primal food (mother's milk) and that it works as an artifi­
cial coping device to relieve stress. 
The field dependence orientation (WItkin, Karp and 
I 
Goodenou'gh 1959) holds that p~rsonallty influences percep-· 
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tion and is therefore understood 1n terms of modes of per­
cept1on. A field dependent individual relies on the visual 
field in which the stimuli occur in making Judgements about 
the stimuli. Field dependent people have difficulty 1n 
dealing analytically with themselves and their environment; 
they tend to have difficulty in distinguishing boundaries 
between self and others and in effect they have a poor sense 
ot separate identity. Karp, et a1. (1965) conc1ude~ after a 
review of literature prior to 1965, that studies generally 
demonstrated that both male and female alcoholics are mark­
edly rield~dependent in their perception. 
TOe alcoholic personality orientation contains two 
contrasti·ng and contradictory points of view (Roebuck and 
Kessler 1972). One view holds that alcoholi~m is a distinct 
.entity and that alcoholics possess a specific personality 
type which predisposes them to alcoholism. The other view 
1s that alcoholism is a symptom of some other form of psy­
chiatric disturbance. 
. The final orientation of the psychological approach 
that will be dealt with in this study is that of Transac­
tional Analysis (Steiner 1969). The transactional orlenta­
tfoil is of particular significance in terms of risk taking 
and will be discussed in detail 1n the following chapter. 
The third and final major approach to explaining alco­
holism 1s the soc1olog1cal approach. This approach 1s not 
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concerned with why a person becomes an alcoholic. Its major 
a1m is directed at explaining and defining rates of alco­
holism for different groups. Evidence from this domain has 
demonstrated that cultural factors playa significant part 
1n determining.drinking behavior. 
For example, Sadoun, ~olli and Silverman (1965) in 
studying drinking patterns in France and Italy, reported 
that although use of wine is common in both countries, inc1­
de9ce of alcoholism is higher.in France. France also dif­
fered ~rom Italy in terms of quantities of wine consumed 
between meals, but not during meals, with the French drink­
Ing more between meals than the Italians~ The Italians have 
a lower conception of the "safe limits" concerning the amount 
of wine which can be consumed without harm than do the 
French. The Italians also do not hold with the French 
belief that copious drinking is associated with virility and 
that intoxication is fashionable. 
Snyder (1958) describes the low incidence of alcohol­
ism among Jews as function .of internal p~essure to conform 
wlt.h Jewish norms and customs. Alcohol consumption 1s 
learned through ritual drinking which teaches Jews how to 
drink 1n a controlled manner. 
Cahalan .(1970) goes so far as to say that, "Whether 
a person drinks at all is primarily a sociological and 
anthropological variable rather than a psychological one' 
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tPp. 20l-20~'J.1f He qualified this contention by stating that 
" • • • a pe~son's abuse of a substance is also dependent 
upon his pe~sonali ty and his immediate environment t:. p. 196). II 
From the above data it should be apparent that an all 
'encompassing explanation fo~ alcoholism is not yet available. 
Because a single model is lacking, an eclectic approach, 
utilizing aspects from the various theories presente~will 
be used to relate alcoholism to risk taking. The next chap­
ter will review the literature of both risk taking and alco­
holism as they relate to each other. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Only two studies were found dealing with risk taking 
1n an alcoholic populatlon. In the flrst, Rule-and Besler 
(1970) arg~ed that alcoholics have difficulty maklng deci­
sions and that alcohol reduces indecision. To test this 
hypothesis they administered a hypothetical dilemmas ques­
tlonnaire to twelve hospitalized alcoholics and to twelve 
alcohol counselors. The questionnaire consisted of three 
1tems from the Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire 
(1964) and two alcohol related dilemmas. The results indi­
cated that the counselors were willing to accept lower odds, 
that is, greater risks, than the alcoholic group. The -mean 
score for the alcoholics was 6.87 on a ten point scale with 
one being very risky and ten very conservative, as opposed 
to a mean score for the counselors of 5.38. The difference 
was significant at the p < .01 level. 
The authors concluded by sug~esting·the following pro­
cess: 
It may be that drinking releases the alcoholic 
from an overly conservative, inhibited stance and 
moves him towards the other extreme, that of h~·h 
risk taking. Thus alcohol presumably reduces 
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1nh1bition. One major need for relief in the non­
dr1nking alcoholic may stem from his conservatism 
1n dec1s1on mak1ng [Rule and Besler 1970, p. 830). 
The second study investigated ethical risk taking in 
alcoholics. The ethical risks hypothesis postulates that 
'unethical behavior varies as a function of the'perceived 
risk incurred by such conduct (Rettig 1963). 
The author (Krause 1971) argued that one reason why an 
alcoholic drinks 1s to reduce h1s fear of failure. Using the 
Behavior Prediction Scale (Rettig 1963) Krause measured the 
reinforcement value of censure of three groups: hosp1tal­
l1zed alcoholics, psychiatric out-patients, and volunteers 
from The Veterans of Foreign Wars. The reinforcement value 
of censure measures how sensitive one is to the magnitude 
of censure or pun1shment resulting from gett1ng caught. Of 
the three groups, alcoholics were more sensitive to the re­
inforcement value of censure than either of the other 
groups. The results also indicated that alcoholics were 
more willing to take ethical risks than were the controls. 
The authors thus concluded that the alcoholics had a higher 
fear of fa1lure than the nonalcoholic and that alcohol acts 
to reduce that fear, thereby increasing their willingness to 
take risks. 
With reference to risk taking and its relation to 

alcohol intake for nonalcoholic subject~ there is somewhat 

more data. Cohen (1960), for example, discovered that bus­
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drivers were willing to negotiate more difficult driving 
courses after they had been drinking than when sober. The 
task called tor the dr1vers to maneuver a bus through a 
series of poles a standard distance apart before and after 
ingest1ng alcohol. In both drinking and sober trials 
drivers were required to state their subjective Judgement as 
to the lev~l of risk involved. After drinking, the drivers 
were willing to drive the bus through poles that were sig­
nificantly narrower. Interestingly, the drivers stated that 
the subjective level of risk was the same under both sober 
and drinking conditions. Alcohol appeared to have modified 
the drivers' perception of the risk involved, making the 
drivers more willing to take objectively defined risks. 
Teger, Katkin and Pruitt (1969) in a gambling experi­
. ment concluded that subjects were more risky after drinking 
than when sober. They surmlsed that alcohol reduces fear of 
failure 'and subsequently increases willingness to risk. 
Ehlers (1966) ·found that subjects took greater risks under 
the. influence of alcohol but only when the conditions of the 
risk were familiar. When the situation was unfamiliar the 
~lcohol ·subJects were more cautious than the sober subjects. 
Hurst (1969) 1n another gambling' experiment determined that 
drink1ng subjects were more willing to make larger bets when 
their personal estimate of the odds, their subjective proba­
bility, was high, than when the subjective probab1l1ty was 
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low. Under the low subjective probability condition·the 
subjects showed either no change in betting behavior or 
became more cautious. 
It would seem that fear of failure thus plays a slg­
.ificant role in alcohol conaumption for alcoholics. The 
results of Krause (1971) and Rule and Besier (1970) would 
~upport a view that alcohol acts to reduce fear of failure 
and may thereby make decision making and other action where 
failure is an issue, less anxiety ridden. 
Studies measuring risk taking' under conditions of 
alcohol influence with nonalcoholic subjects have also 
demonstrated that the ingestion of alcohol reduces fear of 
fal1ure and increases wi11ingne.ss to take risks (Cohen 1960; 
T~ger, Katkin and Pruitt 1969). The Hurst (.1969) and Ehlers 
(1966) studle~ however, indicate that there may be specific 
situations where alcohol does not increase willingness to 
risk. 
There are two directions available at this point given 
the absence of a significant amount of data relating alco­
holism or alcohol and risk taking. One might be to discuss 
the theoretical and experimental evidence on alcoholism and 
1~ent1ry some implications for general risk-~king behavior 
or alcoholics. A second alternative mlght be to relate some 
ot the generally accepted character1stics of alcoholics to 
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experimentally derived data about risk taking. , I shall deal 
with both and start with the former. 
Some models of alcoholism deal quite directly with the 
concepts of risk and ambiguity. The Transactional Analysis 
model (Berne 1967, Steiner 1971) provides a basis for under­
standing alcoholism in terms of risk taking because of its 
concept of childhood decisions. 
This theory postulates that from the moment a child is 
born he begins receiving data about what the world is like. 
In addition to the observational data the child receives 
from his environment he also receives from his p~rent8 in­ : 
j~nctions on how he is to behave and also verbal data about 
"lif,e ft and how to function in the world. Based on this data 
the child makes decisions on how he is going. to live up to 
his parents,'requirements and still maintain his personal 
autonomy. For the alcoholic the early decision is that he 
is "not OK" but that the rest of the world is all right. 
The conflict for the child is that while he is not treated 
in a way which allows him to feel good about himself, he 
also sees that his parents are not living the kind of life 
they are-demanding of him. Therefore the complete early 
de'olsion is that "I'm not OK and you are, ha, ha." The 
laugh signifies that underneath the admission of guilt is 
the belIef that those people who are admonishing him for his 
bad conduct are just as guilty as he. 
; 
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The remainder of the alcoholic's life 1s structured 
a~round creating situations which validate these early life 
<lecislons. The method for 8'ccompllshlng thIs feat is the 
"Alcoholic Game" (Steiner 1971). Risk for the alcoholic 
trom a transactional point of view is to act 1n conflict 
with the early life decision. Much as Maslow (1968) and 
Polster ('19('2) have indicated in terms of their therapies, 
the individual thus prefers to remain in the security of the 
known rather than risk the ambiguity and/or uncertainty of 
the unknown. In Transactional theory, security is to play 
the "Alcoholic Game tt and thereby maintain the early, child­
like view of the world. 
It seems reasonable to assume that those individuals 
who are unwilling or unable to tolerate a moderate amount of 
ambiguity or to take a reasonable risk would be the ones 
most likely to keep drinking as the best way to continue 
_,playing the game. Thus, one conclusion that m1ght be drawn 
from the l1terature on Transactional Analysis is that those 
alcoholics who demonstrate the greatest tolerance of ambi­
gu1ty and demonstrate the 'greatest willingness to take 
moderate risks would be the ones having the best prognosis. 
It is important to note at thfs point that. r1sk and 
ambiguity 1n a Transactional Analysis context refer to the 
same thing: a capacity to withstand the pressures of the 
unknown. Taking risks which virtually assure failure, low 
l I 
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odds ot ~uccess, although risky in terms of odds are often 
-the precursors of the next drinking episode. 
I 4nother theorist (Bateson 1971) argues that sobr1ety 
I for th~ alcoholic is itself the pathological state and that!. 
dr1nki~g provides some correction for this error. "In other 
words, compared with his sobriety, which is 1~ someway 
'wrong' his intoxication must be in someway 'right' CP.2)." 
The baSis for this logic is the epistemological position 
that cc;>nscioue will, or nself" is separate and distinct from 
the re~lnder of the personality. What the alcoholic does 
is to deny the unpleasant actions he takes in order to say: 
"That wasn't I who did that, it was the alcohol," or, ItI 
don't ~now wh~t came over me." In each instance the alco­
holic separates his sense of "self" from behavior that is 
incongruous with his idealized notion of himself. Basic to 
this separation, 1s the belief that conscious will is the 
"self" and to be in tune with that will is to be all right. 
~teBon uses the idea of "alcoholic pride" to illus­
~ ·trate ~is point. Pride for the alcoholic is not contex­
tually structured around past achievements. Instead it is 
structl,1red aroupd a response to -.the challenge of ur can 
quit n or, trI can stay sober." The emphaSis 1s in the chal­
lenge with success being less important than the act of 
ach1evtng success. After a period of success the challenge 
dlmini~hes and the new challenge becomes, If I can take a 
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drink and not go on a binge." It is now no longer good 
enough to say, n I have qu it. IP Thu s the challenge component 
ot Ifalc-oholic pride" 1s linked to risk taking with the 
principle being, Itr can do something whel'e success 1s im­
. pX'obable and failure would be disastrous C' Bateson 1971, 
p. 91. If 
It seems that for an alcoholic there are two accept­
able states. One is the drunken condition which is void of 
any responsibility for either selt or others. The second 
state is to be sober, but sober in a way which makes the 
• 
alcoholic appear superhuman--someone who can, at will,
'1 
return to drinking at an acceptable level. 
The challenge component of pride is further reduced 
from the stated test of selt-control, III can take a drink 
and stop," to the unstated and unstateable purpose of prov­
lng that self-control is ineffectual and absurd. The pro­
position that self-control will not work is a policy decision 
formed in the levels of the mind Lwhich] are pre­II. • • 
linguistic and the computations which go on there are coded 
in primary process t. Bateson 1971, p. 121. n The risk of tak­
ing a drink to prove that it can 1s in reality a "set-up" 
which will prove that it cannot be done and that. therefore 
selt-control is not attainable. 
Both articles would agree that risk for the alcoholic 
need be defined from the alcoholic's po~nt of view. 
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Therefore, in measuring risk taking 1n ~n alcoholic, one 
need be aware that odds and probabilities are not the sole 
basis on "which to Judge whether the person is risking or 
~ot. For most people, the act of taking a drink by an 
alcoholic may seem a tremendous risk in terms of the poten­
tial for him to return to uncontrolled drinking. For the 
alcoholic the act of taking a drink may be the best way to 
continue playing the "Alcoholic Game" and prove that self­
control is absurd. 
By looking at both the data on alcoholism and the 
data on risk taking several overlapping areas can be found. 
Both Krause (1971) and Rule and Besier (1970) referred to 
"fear of failure" as a motivating force in the behavior of 
alcoholics. "Fear of failure" may also be construed as a 
motivator in general risk taking behavior. 
McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell (1953) devel­
oped a theory of achievement motivation that incorporates 
the concept of fear of failure and risk taking. The model 
postulates that there are two kinds of motives for situa­
tions in which one is attempting to meet a criterion of 
excellence: the mot1ve to achieve success and the motive 
to avoid failure. All people are supposed to have each of 
these mot1ves, but 1n varying degrees. These two motives, 
when combined with an individual1s subjective probabilities 
and incentives, yield a measure of risk-taking behavior. 
1 
I 
------~---------------------------------~ 
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Expressed algebraically these, are: 
Motivation = (MsxPsx1s) + (MfXPfXIf). 
Me = Motivation to achieve success. 
= Subjective probability of success.Ps 
Is = Incentive value of success. 
are the motivation, probability and incentive 
values associated with avoiding failure. 
When motivation to achieve success is stronger than 
motivation to avoid failure, the total motivation factor is 
strongest when the probability values are at .5. The fol­
lowing example should illustrate this point: 
(MsxPsxIs = Approach) + (MfXPfxlf + Avoidance) = Resultant 
2 0.1 0.9 = 0.18 1 0.9 -0.1 = -0.09 0.09 
2 0.5 0.5 = 0~50 1 0.5 -0.5 = -0.25 0.25 
2 0.9 0.1 =,0.18 1 0.1 -0.9 = -0.09 0.09 
Therefore, individuals in whom the motivation to achieve 
success is stronger than the motivation to avoid failure' 
should be drawn to situations of intermediate difficulty, 
those possessed of moderate odds. Those 'individuals with 
stronger mot1vat10n to avoid failure will choose situations 
where the odds are either very high or very low. A conser­
vative response, high odds of success, 1s consistent with 
the individual's need to avoid failure. The risky low odds 
of success response is also a way of dealing with fear of 
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failure because with very low odds, success is generally not 
anticipated by those evaluat1ng one's performance. 
Studies by Atkinson, Bastion, Earl and Litwin (1960) 
and Atkinson and Litwin (1960) were supportive of the 
achievement motivation model. However, since those experi­
ments, Littig (1963) and Raynor (1966) have posed questions 
as to the generalizability of the construct in different 
situations. Under experimental conditions where com~etition 
is an issue, fear of failure subjects preferred high risk 
choices over extreme conservatism .. Also under competitive 
conditions l high need achievers demonstrated an increasing 
preference !or conservative bets as the experiment went on. 
In general, however, the model still seems valid for non­
competitive situations and therefore useful 1n terms of the 
present study. 
Given that "fear of failure" is a motivating force for 
alcoholi-cs, one might hypothesize a preference for extreme 
conservatism o.r risk as being likely. One could further 
hypqthesize that a reduction in this preference for extreme 
odds would be indicative of a reduct'ion in "fear of failure" 
and ther~fore a reduction in the motivation to drink.' 
Studies on field dependence (Witkin, Karp and 
Goodenough 1953; Karp, Witkin and Goodenough 1959) have 
demonstrated that alcoholics are more field dependent than 
are nonalcoholics; that is, very dependent on the visual 
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field in which the stimuli occurs in terms of making judge­
ments about the stimuli. Another group of studies (Wertheim 
and Mednick 1958; Meyer, Walker and Litwin 1961) have demon­
s'trated that field dependence 1s posit1vely correlated with 
high fear of ,failure. High field dependence and high fear 
of failure go together. From this line of reasoning we 
arrive at the conclusion that alcoholics will be more likely 
i' 
to advocate odds e1ther risky or conservative as opposed to 
moderate odds. 
Yet another way of relating the work on field depend­
ence and alcoholism 1s to examine the definition. Field 
dependent people seek structure from the environment and 
view the environment as controlling them as opposed to their 
controlling the environment. Risk-taking data (Rotter 1962) 
regarding individu~ls who see the locus of control as being 
external show that these people ~referred odds which were 
either risky or conservative. Those seeing the world as 
something which can be controlled preferred moderate risks. 
Kogan and Wallach (1967) conducted experiments seeking 
to determine whether risk-taking strateg1es were generalized 
throughout a series of different contexts. In each context 
the subject chooses a risk-taking' strategy and must stay with 
that strategy for a f1xed period of time. At some point the 
'experimenter offers the option of changing. strategies. 

Persons with high motivational disturbances, as measured 
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by test anx1ety and defensiveness scores, exhibited sub­
. stantial degrees of constancy 'in their risky or conservative 
strateg1es. Those with low motivational disturbance scores 
showed more variability in strategies between the different 
tasks. They seemed to see more options and were willing to 
use them. When offered an opportunity to change strategies 
those who scored low on the'motivational disturbance scales 
took advantage of the opportunity if they were losing. That 
is, their risk-taking strategy was not working. Those who 
scored high on the motivational disturbance scales and were 
losing, did not express a desire to change their strategies. 
On the contra~ they seemed satisfied with their bets. 

Kogan and Wallach (1964) concluded: 

••• not only does the risky conservative behavior 

of maximally disturbed individuals seem strongly 

generalized in the sense of showing high consistency 

across varying tasks and situational contexts, but 

th1s behaVior also tends to lead the individual into 

maladapt1ve postures toward his environment tp. 203). 

On the 'basis of this data one might expect that alco­
holics who show little change in their risk taking strate­
gies would continue to behave in the same "maladaptive" 
manner as before and therefore continue to drink. 
In summary, the author feels the data on risk taking 
and alcoholism appear to warrant the following conclusions: 
1. 	 Reduction of "fear of failure ll is a motivating
force for the nondrinking alcoholic and the 
1ngestion of alcohol seems to reduce this fear. 
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2. 	 Scores for alcoholics on risk-taking instruments 
will show a preference for odds of extreme risk 
and/or oonservatism as a positive function of 
IIrear of failure. 1I That is, as Iffear of failure" 
decreases, preference for extreme odds will 
reduce. 
3. 	 "Risk" for alooholics should be measured in terms 
of tolerance of ambiguity or moderate odds and 
not for extreme risk taking. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Procedure 
Sixty hospitalized alcoholics were given the Kogan­
Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionna1re (Kogan and Wallach 
1964) upon admission to the Dammash State Hospital Alcohol 
Treatment Program. Criteria for subject selection was: to 
have volun~arily agreed to part1cipate in the research, and. 
to have been admitted to the Alcohol Treatment Program no 
longer than four days prior to completion of the testing. 
No further requJrements were made of the subjects unt1l four 
days prior to discharge from the Alcohol Treatment Program. 
Within that four day period each subject was again given the 
Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire. Since only one 
form of the questionnaire was used, each subject therefore 
responded to .the same items twice; once on admission and 
once OIl discharge. 
Procedure for administering the questionnaire was as 
r~llows: each subject was seen indlyidually. The subJ~ct 
was asked to read the instructions, after which any ques­
tions he had were answered. When the subject had stated 
he understood the requirements of the task he was then asked 
I 
.
i 
, 
37 

to explain in his own words what he was supposed to do. Any 

. errors in his understanding of the task were corrected be­
fore allow-tng the subject to complete the questionnaire. 
Subjects who could not grasp the requirements of the ques­
tionnalr~ in the experlmenter 1 s Judgmen~were excluded from 
the sample. The questionnaire was then compl~ted in the 
presence of the experimenter. 
Adm1nistration of the questionnaire at the t1me of 

discharge differed from the 1n1t1al procedure 1n the follow­

ing ways: 1) Subjects were aga1n required to paraphrase 

:the task of the questionna1re, to the satisfact10n of the : 

exper1menter, but this time they were not requ1red to re­

read the 1nstruct1ons. 2) Subjects were not requ1red to 

complete the quest10nna1re in the presence of the experi­

menter because of the frequent conflict between Program 

requirements and experimenter availability. Subjects com­

pleted the questionna1re at their convenience and returned 

it before leaving the hospital. 3) Subjects were not told 

why they were taking the quest1onna1re the 'sec~nd time until 

Just pr10r to d1scharge and only at the1r request. 

All subjects were told that participation in the re­

search was voluntary and that all responses would be held in 

strict eonfldence. The questionnaire was descr1bed as a 

device for measuring att1tudes and op1n1ons and 1t was 

emphasized that there were no r1ght or wrong answers. 

i 
1 
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Add1tionally, the subjects were told that the research was 
being conducted as part of the author's education and that 
any direct benefit to them was likely to be small. The pur­
pose of the research was explained a~ an attempt to measure 
how individuals with drinking problems viewed different 
sorts of decision-making dilemmas. 
Data concerning attendance at the out-patient clinics 
was collected by Alcohol Treatment Program staff as part of 
their own record keeping. The experimenter used the Program 
records to obtain out-patient attendance data pertinent to 
this research. 
: ;
In this manner three sets of primary data were ob­ : I 
tained. The first consisted of questionnaire response dur­
ing the early stages of the treatment program. The second 
consisted of questionnaire responses Just prior to discharge 
or atter the treatment program was virtually completed. The 
~inal data was the frequency of attendance at the out­
patient clinics after the subject was discharged from the 
hospital. For subjects to be considered attending an out­
patient clinlc, they had to come to the clinlc four times 
during the three month follow-up period. 
Risk-Taking. Instrument 
The Kogan-Wallach Choice Dilemmas Questionnaire (CDQ) 
(Kogan and Wallach 1964) consists of twelve situations, each 
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containing a central person faced with a choice between two 
courses of action. One of these courses entails a greater 
risk of fallure, but also yields greater rewards if suceess­
ful. The second course of act10n is to choose a safe, 
st~ble, non risky, but less rewarding alternative. The sub­
Ject's task is to advise the person in each of the twelve 
situations by selecting the probabIlity of success con­
s1dered sufficient to warrant choosing the risky alterna-
I 
, 
t1ve. 1
, 
The author feels there are several drawbacks to us1ng 
this questionnaire as a measure of risk taking. The most 
obvious is that subjects are not required to risk anything. 
The measure 1s hypothetical. Another potential difficulty 
involves the complexity of the task, in terms of the sub­
Ject's capacity to understand and provide valid answers. 
A third problem area 1nvolves the content of the items, in 
that the Bituations may not tap the real world of the alco­
hollc and they are exclusively male oriented. 
The first drawback'is', in part, a spec1fic case of the 
general1zed question of whether or not one can take data 
gath~red 1n a laboratory and extrapolate to the real world. 
More specifically, the question 1s whether one c~n general­
u;e from a hypothetical measure of risk taking to a real, 
albe1t laboratory, measure and then from the laboratory to 
the real world. Evidence to date (MYers and Sadler 1960; 
j 
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Katz 1962; and Suydam and Meyers 1962) suggests than an in­
dividual's strategy or attitude toward risk taking remains 
generally con£tant over the two conditions, but may shift 
slightly toward conservatism 1n the real risk-taking situa­
tions. 
The second area of concern--the capacity or the sub­
Jects to provide va11d,responses--was controlled via the 
administrat10n procedures outlined earlier in this chapter. 
The th1rd problem area, that of the content of the 
I 
dIlemmas, could have been reduced by developing a question­ 1 
naire that would include alcohol dilemmas appropriate for 
both men and women. The pragmatic factor of t~me involved 
1n developing such a questionnaire precluded this as an 
alternative. 
There were many advantages to using the CDQ. The 
first, was that the questionnaire had been used in a variety 
of other risk-taking experiments and thus provided a base 
for discussion of data from the present study to others. A 
second advantage to using the CDQ was the capacity of the 
questionna1re to prov1de data on both odds and amb1guity. 
The third advantage also deals with the content of the 
items. Although the items may not tap the real world of the 
alcoho11c, both male and female, they do attempt to present 
a serles of problems which are closer to reality than many 
of the other measures of risk taklng. The typical measure 
' 
I 
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of risk taking (other than the CDQ) involves partic1pation 
·In some sort of game-like situation. 
The Therapy Program 
The Dammasch State Hospital Alcohol Program is funded 
by a Federal grant and has a stafr that consists of two phy­
sicians, two social workers, six casemanagers; one clinical 
psychologist, five registered nurses and twenty psychiatric 
aides. The simplest way to describe the operation of the 
program is to outline the process by which an individual is 
admitted, treated and followed after discharge. 
Males are admitted to the general peych~atric wards 
tor detoxification. Women are admitted to the ward on which 
the program takes place, but are not involved in the program 
until after they have been detoxified. The length of the 
detoxification process varies, but it usually takes five 
days. During this time period the individual is contacted 
and informed of the nature and content of the Alcohol Treat­
ment Program, and the alternatives available throughout the 
hospital. Should the patient request admission to the pro­
gram he is given the MMPI and an appointment for screening. 
Admiss10n to the program 1s not automatic. The 
screening process includes an evaluation of the patient's 
mot1ves, needs and desires and the capacity of the hospital 
program to meet them. At the screening meeting a treatment 
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contract is worked out and, if admitted, the patient is 
,transferred to the program ward the same day. The contract 
tor treatment includes a stated desire to change or modify 
some aspect of their personality that 1s workable in the 
hospital setting. The contract also indicates the patient's 
agreement to participate in the program and an agreement to 
stay in the program for the 'required length of the therapy, 
thirty days. 
Individuals not admitted to the program will typically 
state that they have no desire to quit drinktng and they are 
only in the hospital to recover their physical strength; or 
'that they are only interested in getting off the wards where 
all the "crazy" people are; or that they do not feel any 
need for change in their behavior except to stop drinking. 
Approximately 80-90 per cent of those requesting admission 
are, in fact, admitted. 
The program itself is centered around participation in 
a wide var1ety of group therapy experiences. Many of the 
groups are oriented to provide an atmosphere where an indi­
vidual can discuss his or her problems arid receive feedback 
from the therapist and/or other group membera. The remain­
der of the groups have specif1c topic areas or techniques, 
but at the core of all gI"OUPS is the goal of expression of 
feelings. 
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The names of groups and their agendas are listed 
below: 
Alcohol Orientation Class - This meeting 1s held 
three times each week for one hour. All patients 
are expected to attend. The meeting consists of 
a series of lectures on alcohol and alcoholism. 
A.A. 	 - Alcoholic Anonymous meetings are held in,the 
hospital twice each week and all patients are 
encouraged to attend. 
Assertiveness Training - This group is designed to 
look at feelings around subassertive behavior and 
to provide techniques and' opportunities to prac­
tice assertive behavior. 
Logotherapy - Logotherapy is essentially a group 
whe~e individuals look at the goals in their lives 
and evaluate whether they are going about achiev­
ing these goals in an efficient or productive man­
ner. 
Women's Group -'The women1s group is devoted to 
looking at the problems of women in our society
and specifically women with d~inking problems. 
Couple's Group - Marital or relationship counseling
1s emphasized here. Particular attention is paid 
to communication skills. 
Recovery, Inc. - This organization is similar in 
goals and structure to A.A., but includes indivi­
. duals with problems of a strictly emotional nature 
in addition to alcohol related problems. 
Relaxation Therapy - ~nls group teaches relaxation 
techniques. 
Relat10nship Improvement - EmphasiS i8 placed on 
discovering the ways in which individuals under- . 
mine th~ir relationships with others and provides 
an arena for practicing new techniques. . 
Looking Inside - Increasing onels self-awareness is 
the goal. 
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Transactional Analysis - Thi& group looks at the 
problems of alcoholism from the perspective of 
the alcoholic game. 
, Attendance as Change 
The use of attendance at the ou't-patient clinics as a 
criteria for change was chosen for three reasons. First, it 
was the clinical opinion of the Alcohol Program staff based 
on experience that patients who do not attend follow-up 
counseling show a higher rate of recidivism than those who 
become involved in the out-patient clinics. Gerard and 
Saenger (1966) also found this to be true. The following is 
an excerpt from their study on "Out-Patient Treatment of 
Alcoholics": 
Extent of treatment was associated with improvement 
in dr1nking. (The reader is reminded that the 
pat1ents were classified in three groups·with re­
spect to extent of contact: minimal (one to four 
visits), moderate (fiv~ to ten visits), and per­
sistent (eleven to more than twenty visits). Only
11 per cent of the group who had minimal contact 
! 
I 
with the clinics improved in drinking, compared to 
I 15 per cent of those who had moderate contact, andr 21.4 per cent of those with perSistent contact.! Extent of contact with the clinics was also asso­
ciated with prolonged abstinence at any time during 
the year between intake and follow-up; and with 
improvement as measured by the index of change in 
over-all adjustment. For example, patients who 
changed at least moderately 1n over-all adjustmentI (that is, dropped an average of at least one point
r from each of the five component indices), were found 
far more often among those who had perSistent orI ,moderate contact with the clinics than among those 
wi th minimal contact (x = 37; p = .001) t: pp. l34-36l.! 
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They concluded by stating that extent of contact at the out­
patient clinics was directly related to improvement in 
dr1nk1ng and secondarily related to improvement 1n the other 
aspects of functioning. 
A second reason for using out-patient attendance was 
that the very act of going to the out-patient clinic may in 
~tself be a measure of willingness to risk. The Federal 
Grant Proposal was based on the belief, supported by the 
patients, that a major reason for not attending out-patient 
clinics was that they were unsure of what to expect or how 
they were going to be treated. Sapir (1958) in her article 
about out-patient clinics for the treatment of alcoholism 
states that one of the functions of the intake interview 
18 to ft ••• reduce the new patient's fear of what he has 
let himself in for by coming to the clinic Cp. 1291." 
A third and very critical reason for using attendance 
at out-patient clinics as the improvement criterion was one 
of methodological pragmatism. That is, given the resources 
available to the author a comprehensive follow-up study 
looking at the multiple aspects of a patient's functioning 
after discharge was not possible. 
Analysis 
. Because risk for alcoholics cannot be measured 
strictly in terms of odds, two additional measures will be 
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used: ambiguity and preference for extreme odds or sure 
bets. These measures are operationally defined in the fol­
lowing section. 
The data will be analyzed in two ways. First, in 
terms of changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and 
post-program testing (PoPT) as a function of the variables; 
sex, age, days in pr~gram, and MMPI scale scores for anx­
~ety and defensiveness. The last three variables require 
further definition. 
For age, PrPT and PoPT scores will be divided into 
three age groups: thirty and under, N = 17; 31-50 years, 
N. = 26; and 51 years and over, N = 17. Scores will be 
analyzed in terms of changes within each group and dif­
ferences between groups for both testing cOQditions. 
For anxiety and defensiveness, subjects will be 
divided into two groups using a median split with the two 
scales. ' Defen~iveness and anxiety scales were taken from 
An MMPI Handbook (Dahlstrom and Welsh 1960). The resulting 
groups will be ijigh Defensiveness/High Anxiety (HD/HA), 
and Low Defensiveness/Low AnXiety (LD/LA). Scores will be 
I analyzed in terms of changes within groups and differences 
I 
! 
I 
between groups • 
For days in the program, again PrPT and PoPT scores 
are divided 1nto three groups composed of subjects who re­
mained in the program less than twenty-one days, subjects 
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who stayed twenty-two to twenty~elght days and subjects who 
·remalned twenty-nine days or more. Scores will be analyzed 
in terms of differences between groups and changes within 
groups. 
The second method of analysis will be to divide the 
entire sample into two groups composed of subJe,cts who 
attended the out-patient clinics after discharge and sub­
Jects who did not. The groups will be called the follow-up 
group (FU) and the non follow-up group (NFU). Data will be 
analyzed 1n terms of differences in P'rPT and PoPT, change 
scores and the variables of age, sex, days, and defensive­
ness and anxiety. 
Operational Definitions 
Odds. Odds will be operatlonally defined in this 
study as the sum of the lowest acceptable probabilities ad­
vocated by the subject. Therefore, given twelve items, the 
most conservative score would be 120. That would require 
the subject to check the response, UNo" for each item, mean­
lng that under no circumstances should the hero of the 
I 
I 
I dllemmas risk his present pOSition. The .most risky score 
1 
i. 
i would be twelve, which would mean that the subject was will­
ing to recommend probabilities of one in ten for each item. 
I 
The sum of twelve ltems with a "Noll response is ten, twelve 
tlmes. The sum of twelve ltems with a one in ten response 
1s one, twelve times. 
! 
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Example: Subject X advocated the following proba­
. bil1ties for each item: 
1. 3 in 10 7. 5 in 10 
2. 7 in 10 8. 9 in 10 
3. 5 1n 10 9. No (or 10 in 10) 
4. 1 in 10 10. 3 1n 10 
5. 9 1n 10 1 11. 7 1n 10 

6 .. 3 in 10 
 12. 9 1n 10 
The sum of the first number in the probability statements 1s 
the odds score. For the example stated above the score 
would be seventy-one. 
Ambiguity. The ambigu1ty score is der1ved from the 
odds score. It is assumed that the odds, f1ve in ten, 1s 
the choice with the greatest ambiguity. ~e rationale is 
that those odds offer the least information as to the poten­
t·ial outcome. One has equal chances of either success or 
failure. Scores of three in ten and seven in ten are 
equally ambiguous because one is 70 per cent sure of the 
outcome. In the case of the risky choice, three in ten, 
one can be fairly sure that the outcome will result 1n fail­
ure. In the case of the conservative choice, se~en in ten, 
aga1n one can be 70 per cent sure that the outcome will re­
sult in suceess. In terms of tolerance for ambiguity it is 
not important whether the outcome is success or failure, but 
Just that the outcome is predictaple. The same line "of rea­
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.soning holds for one in ten and nine 1n ten, at a 90 per 
cent assurance of the outcome. When the individual chooses 
the "No" respons~ he is saying, tlI am not w1lling to riski 

anything," and this represents the least toleranoe for ambi­\. 
I 

gUity. Ambiguity scores are calculated by assigning a score 
of one to the probabilities choice of five in ten; three to 
the probabilities choice.s of both three in ten and seven in 
~en; five to the probabi11ties choices of both one in ten 
and nine in ten; and six to the "No" response. 
Example: Transformation of Odds score into Ambiguity 

score: 

Item 1. 3 "in 10 3 Item 7. 5 1n 10 1 

2 •. 7 in 10 3 8. 9 in 10 5 

3. 5 in 10 1 9. II NO " 6 

4'. 1 1n 10 5 10. 3 in 10 3 

5. 3 in 10 3 11. 7 in 10 3 

6. .,9 1n 10 5 12 • 9 in 10 5 

I 
The Ambigulty score for:· this group of probability choices is 
forty-three. 
Sure Bets. These are the responses which consist of 
I 
: 
I . th.e odds, one in ten, nine in ten, and "No." Choice of one 
~ of these three probabilities is indicative of·a desire to 
have maximal certainty. Sure Bets w1ll be scol'ted in term's 
of frequency of choice of one of these probab1lities in each 
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questionnaire. A Sure Bet score of five on a questionnaire 
.would indicate that on five of the twelve items the subject 
advocated one of the sure bet probab1l1ties. 
Increased Risk Taking. This phrase will be used in 
\ 
many of the hypotheses. In each case it will mean a decrease 
in the scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for supe 
bets. A decrease in the odds score reflects a willingness 
to accept fewer chances of success, or increased riskyness. 
A decrease in ambiguity scores is indicative of increased 
tolerance of ambiguity. A decrease in preference for sure 
bets reflects that the subject is advocating fewer sure 
bets. All decreases are. determined between 'pre-program 
testing and post-program testing. 
Alcoholics. It is assumed that individuals requiring 
hospitalization for their drinking problems meet the require­
ments outlined in the World Health Organization definition. 
Therefore, "Alcoholics" is defined as those individuals 
admitted to Dammasch State Hospital with a diagnosis of 
alcohol addiction. 
Hypotheses 
HYQothesis #1. The follow-up group (FU) will show 
larger changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and post­
program testing (PoPT), in the direction of increased risk 
taking, than the non follow-up 'group (NFU) for odds, ambi­
guity, and preference for sure bets. 
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Hypothesis #2. The FU group scores for odds, ambi­
'gu1ty and preference for sure bets will be lower numerically 
in the PoPT oondition than the NFU group_ 
Hypothesis #3. Subjects categorized in terms of high 
defensiveness and high-anxiety will show less change in risk 
scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets than 
those subjects categorized as low defensiveness and low anx­
iety. 
Hypothesis #4. Differences between PrPT and PoPT for 
odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will be greatest 
with younger subjects in the direction of increased 'risk , 
taking and differences will decrease with increased age. 
Hypothesis #5. Risk scores for the age group th1rty 
years and under will be less than scores for age group 
thirty-one to f1fty years which will be less than scores for 
f1fty-one years and over. 
HYpotheSis #6. Differences between PrPT and PoPT 
scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will 
increase as a function of increased number of days spent 
part1cipat1ng in the program. 
H~PQthesls #7. There will be no signifi~ant differ­
ences between men and women for odds, ambiguity, or prefer­
ence for sure bets in either the pre or post-program testing 
scores. 
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Hypothesis #8. There will be no sign1ficant dlffer­
·ences between men and women for odds, ambIguity and prefer­
ence for sure bets 1n terms of amount of change between PrPT 
and PoPT • 
.DefinItion 'of Symbols 
Pre-test sum of lowest acceptable probabl1i­
. ties. 
Post-test sum of lowest acceptable probabili­
ties. 
Bl Pre-test sum of amb1gu1ty scores. 
! 
l 
IB2 	 Post-test sum of ambigu1ty scores. , ! 
: j 
- Frequency of scores falling in the Bet defined 	 : 1Cl \ 	 by ftems numbers 1, 9, or No, in pre-program : 1
condition. (PSB) I 
Frequency of scores falling 1n the set defined 
by items numbers 1, 9, or No, in post-program
.condition. 
PrPT -	 Pre-program testing. 
PoPT -	 Post-program testing. 
FU- Follow-up group. Subjects attending out­

patient clinics. 

NFU 	 Non follow-up group. Subjects not attending
out-pat1ent c11n1cs. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The chapter will be organized into three sections. 
The first section will present the results and analysis 
of data specifically related to the hypotheses. The second 
section will present f1nd1ngs relating the secondary var1­
abIes (age, sex, etc.,) to attendance at the out-patient 
.. 	 clinics. The third section will discuss all of the results 
and suggest possible interpretations. 
Section 1 
Hypothesis #1. The follow-up group (FU) will show 
larger changes between pre-program testing (PrPT) and post­
program testing (PoPT) in the direction of increased risk 
takingl than the non follow-up group (NFU) for odds, ambi­
gu1ty, and preference for sure bets. 
The mean scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for 
aure bets in the pre-program (PrPT) and post-program (PoPT) 
testing conditions for the follow-up group (FU) are pre­
., 
sented in Table I. 
INote that on page 50, "increased risk taking" is de­
fined in terms of decreases in scores for odds, ambiguity,
and preference for sure bets. See definition for further 
explanation. 
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TABLE I 
~N RISK SCORES FOR FOLLOW-UP GROUP 
i 
I 
I 
. Preference ForI 
I Odds Ambiguity Sure Betsr 
I PrPT 75.61 44.22 5.65 
PoPT 66.42 38.70 4.04 
All scores changed in the direction of increased risk 
taking. The t test for related measures (Bruning and 
Kintz 1968) was utilized to evaluate differences between 
the two testing conditions. The .05 probability level of 
significance for a one tailed test was used. Differences 
are statistically significant for all three measures: odds, 
t = 3.052, df = 22, P < .01; ambiguity, t = 4.198, df = 22, 
P < .001; preference for sure bets, t = 4.021, df = 22, 
p < .001. 
Mean scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for 
sure bets in the pre and post-program testing conditions for 
the non follow-up group (NFU) were not significantly dif­
rerent at the .05 level. (Table 11)­
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TABLE II 
MEAN RISK SCORES FOR NON FOLLOW-UP GROUP 
Preference For 
Odds Ambiguity Sure Bets 
PrPT 68.75 '41.69 4.47 

PoPT 66.78 39.86 4.33 

One way that the FU and NFU groups seem to differ is 
1n terms of change in risk-taking attitudes. The FU group 
risk scores changed in the direction of increased risk tak­
ing to a significant degree whereas the NFU group risk 
scores did not. To further evaluate the differences between 
the two groups in terms of changes in risk scores the mean 
change for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets was 
compared. The mean change was calculated by averaging the 
d1fferences between PrPT and PoPT scores for each risk mea­
sure. In Table III, 9.19 represents the average change for 
the odds score between PrPT and PoPT for ~he follow-up 
group. For the 'non follow-up group the average change was 
1.97. The differences in the rnean change for all risk mea­
sures were tested for significance using the t' test for 
independent means (Bruning and Kintz 1968). The .05 
probability level of significance for a one tailed test was 
.~ 
used. The FU and NFU mean change were significantly dif­
.ferent for all measures with the FU mean change being larger 
1n each case: odds, t = 1.923, df = 57, p < .03; ambiguity, 
t = 1.93, df = 57, p < .03, preference for sure bets, 
t = 2.50, df = 57, p < .01. 
TABLE III 
MEAN CHANGE SCORES FOR RISK MEASURES 
IN FU AND NFU GROUPS 
Preference For 
Odds Ambiguity Sure Bets 
PO 9.19 5.21 1.61 
Nru 1.97 1.83 .14 
DIFFERENCE 7.22 3.69 1.47 
Based on the above data, Hypothesis #1 is accepted. 
The follow-up group changed significantly in the d1rectlo~ 
of increased risk tak1ng whereas the non follow-up group did 
not and the amount of change was significantly larger for 
the follow-up group. 
Hypothesis #2. The FU group scores for odds, ambi­
guity and preference for sure bets will be lower numerically 
in the PoPT condition than the NFU group. 
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Table IV presents the PoPT means for odds, ambiguity
I. 
1 
and preference for sure bets for the ·FU and NFU groups. The 
differences are barely in the predicted direction. That is, 
the FU group scores are only slightly less than the NFU 
group scores and the differences are insignificant. There­
fore Hypothesis #2 is not accepted. 
TABLE IV 
POST-PROGRAM RISK ~NS FOR 
FU AND NFU GROUPS 
Preference For 
Odds Ambig':1 ity Sure Bets 
FU 66.42 38.70 4.04 

NFU 66.78 39.86 4.33 

Hypothesis #3. Subjects categorized in terms of high 
defensiveness and high anxiety will show less change in risk 
scores for odds, ambiguity and, preference for sure bets than 
those subjects categorized as low defensiveness and low 
anXiety • 
•1 
1 
! Table V presents the mean amount of change of subjects 
I 
\ 
\ 
\ 
\ in the high defensiveness/anxiety and low defensiveness/ 
" 
anxiety categories for odds, ambiguity and preference for 
sure bets. 
r 

I 
) 
/' 
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TABLE V 
CHANGE SCORES FOR RISK MEASURES 

IN MMPI CATEGORIES 

. Preference For 
Odds Ambiguity Sure Betsi 
I High Defensiveness/
Anxiety 16.38 6.25 .25 
\ 
Low Defensiveness/I Anxiety .44 2.00 .57 
In the low d{efensiveness/anxlety category the differ­
. 
ences between PrPT and PoPT for each risk measure are insig­
nificant at the .05 level. In the high defensiveness/anxiety 
category the differences between PrPT and PoPT are signi­
ficant for odds (t = 2.074, df = 7, p < .05) for a one 
tailed test for related measures. There are no significant\ 
differences for ambiguity or preference for sure bets. 
The odds measure was the only measure where there was 
a significant difference between the two groups, high de­
fensiveness/anxiety and low defensiveness/anxiety, in terms 
of mean change score (t = 1.g8, df = 22, p < .05). There 
1 were no significant differences in terms of mean change 
I 
I 
scores for the other two measures, ambiguity and preferencer 
! 
for sure bets. 
I 
I 
, , 
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With the only significant differences being in the 
category not predicted by the hypothesis, clearly the hy­
~ 
1 pothesis 1s rejected. 
I Hypothesis #4. Differences between PrPT and PoPT for 
I· ad.ds, ambigui ty and preference for sure bets will be greatest
I 
. . 
with younger subjects, in the direction of increased risk1 
taking, and ·differences will decrease with increased age.I 
i 
 Pre-program and post-program test scores for odds, 

i 
 ambiguity and preference for sure bets are presented in 
Table VI in terms of three age groups; thirty years and 
under, thirty-one to fifty years, and fifty-one years and 
older. The letters Al and A2 refer to the mean odds scores 
for PrPT and PoPT respectively; Bl and ~ represent ambi­ , ~ 
guity in PrPT and PoPTj and C1 and C2 refer to preference 
for sure bets in PrPT and PoPT./
/' 
TABLE VI 
MEAN RISK SCORES BY AGE 

FOR PrPT AND PoPT 

·c1 

30 and under 72.41 72.29 41.55 38.47 4.53 3.71 
31-50 70.81 62.46 44 .73 . 40.35 5.58 4.31 
51 and over 72.12 67.77 40.59 38.35 4.53 4.18 
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The d1fferences between PrPT and PoPT in odds, amb1­
gu1ty and preference for sure bets for the th1rty years and 
under group were not signif1cant. For the thirty-one toI 
\ fifty years age group the PrPT and Po?T scores were s1gn1f1­
'cantly d1fferent for all measures of r1sk, with the changesI' 
in the direction of 1ncreased risk tak1ng. The d1fferenceI 
for odds was 8.347, t = 2.906, df = 25, p < .01; for amb1­I guity the difference was 4.385, t = 3.246, df = 25, p < .001; 
I for preference for sure bets the difference was 1.269, 
1 t = 2.741, df = 25, p < .01. Only in the odds measure did 
1 
I 
the f1fty-one years and older group change s1gnif1cantly, 
t = 2.093, df = 16, p < .05. For both amb1gu1ty and pref­
erence for sure bets differences were not s1gnif1cant. The 
t test for related measures was used in the foregoing analy­
S1~. 
There were also no significant differences between the 
three age groups in terms of the mean change between PrPT 
and PoPT us1ng the t test for independent means. Therefore 
th1s hypothesis 1s rejected. 
Hypothes1s #5. Risk scores for the age group thirty 
years and under will be 1e35 than scores for th1rty-one to 
f1fty years, which will be less than scores for fifty-one 
years and over. 
There were no signif1cant differences between any of 
the age groups for any of the risk measures in the pre-
I• 
.
I 
. 
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program testing condition. In the post-program testing con­
dition there was a significant difference between the odds 
scores of age group thirty-one to fifty years and thirt,y 
Y,ears and under with the former being lower (t = 2.052, 
df = 41, p < .05). The hypothesis that younger subjects 
will advocate greater risks is rejected. The t test for in­
dependent means was used In the above analysis. 
BYPothesis #6. Differences between PrPT and PoPT 
scores for odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets will 
increase as a function of increased number of days spent 
partiCipating in the program. 
Mean risk scores for odds, ambiguity and preference 
tor sure bets for the three categories according to days in 
program are presented in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
MEAN RISK SCORES BY DAYS 
FOR PrPT AND PoPT 
Odds ~mbiguity 
21 days
·and less 
22-28 days 
29 days 
or more 
PrPT PoPT PrPT PoPT 
71.0 70.6 47.9 44.0 
73.0 68.1 41.9 39.2 
69.8 62.4 40.6 '36.2 
Preference 

For Sure Bets 

PrPT PoPT 
6.6 5.7 
4.7 3.8 
4.5 3.6 
1 
1 
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There are 	no significant differences between PrPT and 
PoPT for any of the risk measures 1n the days category 
twenty-one days or less. For the days 1n program category 
~wenty-two to twenty-eight days, the~e were significant dif­
. ferences between PrPT and PoPT for odds (t = 2.755, df = 29, 
P < .01) and ambiguity (t = 2.257, df = 29, p < .05) but not 
. . 
for preference for sure bets. All differences 1n the twenty-
nine days 	and over oategory were significant: odds, 
t = 2.118, df = 18, p < .05; ambiguity, t = 3.416, df = 18, 
p < .01; preference for sure bets, t = 1.830, df = 18, 
p < .05. 	 The t test for related measures was used in the 
above. 
Analysis of the mean change scores for each of the 
three groups revealed no significant differences in terms of 
anyone group changing to a greater degree than any other. 
The t test fop-independent means was used in each case for a 
one tailed, .05 level of significance. 
Although there seems to be movement towards increas­
lngly significant differences as a function of days in the 
program, the magnitude of the differences is not significant 
and therefore the hypothesis is rejected. 

Hypothesis #7. There will be no significa~t dlffer­
1 . 	 erences between men and women for odds, ambiguity, or pref­
erence for sure bets in either the pre or post-program 
testing scores. 
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Table VIII presents the risk scores for men and women 
in the PrPT and PoPT testing conditions. There are no sig­
nificant differences for either ambiguity or odds in either 
testing condition. For odds there were no significant dif­
ferences in the post-program testing condition, but there is 
a significant difference in the pre-program testing condi­
tion, t = 2.326, df = 58, p < .05. The hypothesis is gen­
erally accepted. 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN RISK SCORES FOR MEN AND WOMEN· 
IN PrPT AND PoPT 
Preference 
Odds Ambiguity For Sure Bets 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
44.15 4.96 5.08PrPT 69.49 79.38 
PoPT 65.09 72---1-6 38.46 4.19 .3.77 
Hypothesls #8. There will be no significant dif­
ferences between men and women for odds, ambiguity and pref­
erence for sure bets in terms of amount of change between 
PrPT and PoPT. 
The mean amount of change between PrPT and PoPT for 
men and women is presented in Table IX. There are no 
I . 

I 
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significant 	dIfferences, for any of the risk measures, 
between men 	 and women. Therefore this hypothesis is accept­
ed. 
, TABLE IX 
MEAN CHANGE FOR MEN AND WOMEN 
\ BETWEEN PrPT AND PoPT 
I 
Preference 	ForI 
 Odds Ambiguity 
 Sure Bets 
i 	 Women 6.62, 5.69 1.31 
Men 4.40 3.00 .77 
\ 
I 
I 	 Section 2 
Each of the variables age, sex, MMPI scores and days 
in program were also analyzed in terms of attendance at the 
ou,t-patient clinics. 
Age. Two measures were used to determine if age was a 
factor in attendance aL-the out-patient clinics., The first 
was the mean age of the two groups. The mean age for the 
follow-up group was 43.48. The mean age of'the non follow-up 
group wa~ 39.65. The difference is 3.83, but is not sta­
ttstically Significant. 
The se'cond measure for age ~as frequency of subjects 
in each.age category attending the clinics. In the thirty 
and under category 29 per cent (five of seventeen) attended 
65 
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follow-up. In the thirty-one to fifty catego17, 34 per cent 
(nine of twenty-six) attended follow-up. In the fifty-one 
and over category 55 per cent (nine of seventeen) attended 
follow-up. Testing for statistical significance was not 
done du·e to time limitations. However, the data suggest 
that increased age was related to increased attendance. 
Further study seems warranted. 
Sex. The number of women subjects attending follow­
up was six (N = 13), which represents 46 per cent of the 
female sample. The --number of men attending the out-patient 
clinics was seventeen out of forty-seven, or 36 per cent. 
T~ere appears to"be a tendency on the part of the women sub­
jects to attend out-patient clinics more often than men. 
Statis"tical analysis was not conducted however, and this 
conclusion 1s made with caution. 
MMPI Scale Scores. The percentage of subjects attend­
" 1ng the 'out-patient clinics for the two MMPI groups was: 
Low defensiveness/anxiety = 18.7 per cent, (three of six­
teen); high defensiveness/anxiety = 37.4 per cent, (three 
of eight). 
Analysis was not done due to time limitations and the 
small N. Again, detailed analysis with larger samples may 
yield significant results. 
Days in Program. The mean number of days in the 
treatment program for the follow-up group was 27.48. The 
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mean number of days for the NFU group was 25.51. The dif­
,terence is 1.97 and not significant. The percentage of sub­
Jects attending FU for each day',s category group 1s: 27.2 
per cent for twenty-one days or less, (three of eleven); 
40 per cent for twenty-two to twenty-eight days, (twelve of 
thirty); and 42.1 for twenty-nine days and over (eight of 
nineteen). Although not analyzed statistically, the data 
appear to indicate that length of time spent in program is 
a factor in attendance at the out-patient clinics. 
Section 3 
The hypothesis that the FU group would nave larger 
changes than the NFU group was supported both 1n terms of 
changes within each group and differences between amount of 
change between groups. The FU group changed significantly 
in all measures of risk and changed in a significantly 
larger amount than the non follow-up group. The NFU group 
did not change significantly between the two testing condi­
tions. 
The second hypothesis, that the follow-up group would 
have scores which would indicate greater ,willingness to 
risk, greater tolerance of ambiguity and lower preference 
for sure bets was not supported. There were no significant 
differences between FU and NFU groups for any of the risk 
measures, for PoPT. That is, at the end of the program all 
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of the subjects were scoring the same on the risk measures 
·and presumably willing to ftrisk n at the 'same level. The 
only pair of scores which were signif1cantly d1fferent be­
tween the two groups was the odds scores in the PrPT condi­
tion. The question then arises, that if there are virtually 
no significant differences between the two grqups in both 
te.sting conditions, where do the differences in change 
scores come from? Table X presents the scores for both 
groups in terms of the sequence high scores to low scores. 
TABLE X 
RISK SCORES FOR FU AND NFU 

GROUPS IN SEQUENCE 

A B C 

FU GROUP/Pre 75.61 44.22 5.65 
NFU GROUpjpre 68.75 41.69 4.47 
NFU GROUP/Post 66.78 39.86 4.33 
FU GROUP/Post 66.42 38.70 4.04 
The FU gr~up in each case started from a pos1tion of 
greater conservatism yet arrived at a score by the end of 
program which was virtually the same as the NFU group. The 
NFU occupied the middle of the progression such that the 
d1fferences between both the pre and post-program testing 
. 
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was not large, but the differences within the groups between 
.pre and post-program testing was significant for the FU 
group. 
The major difference between the two groups was not 
riskyness, tolerance of ambiguity or preference for sure 
bets at the end of the program, but the amount of change 
that occurred on these measures between the testing dates. 
One explanation for the above data would be in terms 
of the reinforcement value of change. The individual who 
changes, in a positive direction, using a specific technique 
is going to be more likely to use that same technique to 
i~duce further change. For example, a golfer finds that 
instruction of a particular kind improves his game by 20 
per cent. Another golfer using the same te~hnique, improves 
only 5 per cent; such that at the end of the instruction 
both golfers are playing at the same level. The improvement 
1s reinforcing of the type of instruction used and logically 
the extent of ·improvement will be a factor in the extent of 
the.reinforcement. Therefore, should the two golfers 
deCide, in the future, to seek further instruction, the in­
dividual who changed the most is going to be more likely to 
use the same kind of instruction than the individual who 
changed the least. 
With the alcoholics, the increased capacity or toler­
ance ef risk taking would correspond to a reduction in "fear 
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of failure." Those subjects who experienced the greatest 
-reduction in "fear of failure" will need to relate this 
change to the experiences of program and probably the thera­
peutic strateg~ used in the program. Therefore, when faced 
with-the option of participating in an out-patfent situation 
using a similar strategy, the subjects achievi~g the greatest 
benefit or change would most likely choose to continue. 
Those subjects who felt little change would find little rea­
son to participate, because that particular technique has 
not proved useful so far. 
A second explanation might be that the large change 
from relative conservatism and structuredness to a position 
ot less structure or more risk leaves the individual in a 
new and somewhat uncomfortable position. The new position 
1s more uncomfortable for the subjects who changed the most 
because it is further removed from the old position and 
therefore more aspects require integration. The uncomfort­
ableness of the new position is therefore a function of the 
lack of fam1liarity of the new behavior and feelings. Al­
though these new feelings and actions may be more adaptive 
and satisfying, they are nonetheless unfamiliar and there­
rore could produce some anxiety. 
It may also be that the out-patient clinic serves as a 
source of security and support for these individuals. 
Attending groups at the out-patient clinics could provide 
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an atmosphere where the individual would receive continued 
support and reinforcement for new behavior as well as a 
place where difficulties could be discussed and worked 
through. The out-patient clinic mig~t thus provide a tem­
porary structure for the individual while he restructures or 
integrates the new perceptions, feelings and behaviors. 
It is also possible that these phenomena could be 
working simultaneously. For the individual who is seeking 
to continue the growth process, or just to maintain the 
growth or change already made; the choice of attending the 
out-patient clinic could be one using a proven technique 
because it is supportive and helps solve problems. 
Clearly the hypothesis that high defensiveness and 
anxiety would yield smaller changes on the risk measures 
than low defensiveness and anXiety was not supported. There 
is even some data that suggests that the reverse conclusion 
might be more accurate. It seems reasonable, in hindSight, 
that given a motivation to change, those individuals suffer­
ing the most (high defensiveness and anxiety) will be the 
ones most eager to reduce this suffering, that ls, change. 
Even if t~e data had been conclusive, there would be a 
problem in interpretation due to a methodological oversight. 
In the Kogan and Wallach (1964) study from which this hypo­
thesis was derived, the risk-taking data was collected 
within a few days of psychological testing. Therefore it is 
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valid to conclude that the psychological data was represent­
ative of the subjects while they were undergoing the risk­
tak1ng experiments. In the present study~-for most sUbJects-­
over three weeks passed from beginning to completion of the 
risk-taking study. It is unknown whether or not a partic­
ular subject who scored in the high defensiveness/anxiety 
range on admission, would still score in that range three or 
four weeks later when the second risk-taking questionnaire 
was administered. To test the hypothesis as stated, one 
would need to know the defensiveness/anxiety scores at the 
time of both risk-taking test conditions. 
The hypothesis that length of stay in the program 
would increase the amount of change between testing condi­
tions was supported in part by the increasing progression of 
statistically significant results. There were no signifi­
cant differences for any of the risk measures in the twenty­
one days or less category. In the twenty-two to twenty­
eight days category, two measures produced significant dif­
ferences, odds and ambiguity. In the third category, 
twenty-nine days and over, all three measures yielded 
significant differences. 
However, the critical factor for this hypothesis was 
the extent or degree of change. ·When the average degree of 
change for each risk measure was compared with the different 
categories, there were no significant differences (see Table 
VII). 
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Age seemed to have an effect on change scores, but not 
'in the predicted manner. Rather than the youngest subjects 
showing the greatest change, the middle (thirty-one to 
rlfty) group changed the most and was, the only group that 
changed significantly in all measures of risk'. The only 
other significant change was in the fifty-one .and older 
group, for odds. All change' scores for the youngest group 
and for the other two measures in the fifty-one and over 
group were nonsignificant. The numerical value of the 
scores were also nonsignificant for all measures in PrPT 
and all but one in PoPT. That is, there wer.e no significant 
differences between scores in PrPT and the only significant 
difference in PoPT was between thirty and under and thirty­
one to fifty-one, with thirty-one to fifty-one being 
riskier. 
The hypothesis that the sex of subjects would not be a 
factor in either the numer1cal values or the extent of 
change was largely supported. In only one instance was 
there a significant difference for either numerical values 
or mean change scores. 
Summary of Results 
1. 	 Attendance at the out-patient clinics was related 
to change in risk-taking scores from admission to 
discharge. All measures of risk showed positive 
changes that were statistically significant". 
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2. 	 Discharge or post-program test scores d1d not pre­
dict attendance at the out-patient c11nics. 
3. 	 There are no major differences between risk scores 
with age as a variable. The time frame th1rty-one 
to fifty years did appear to show the greatest 
potent1al for change in risk taking. Age does not 
seem to be a clear factor in attendance at the 
out-patient clinics. 
4. 	 Again, there is no clear difference between risk­
taking scores of men and women. Sex does not 
appear to be a significant factor in attendance 
at the out-patient clinics. Further study with a 
larger female sample may prove dIfferent, because 
the women attended 10 per cent more often than did 
the men. Sex, however, may be a factor in attend­
ance at the out-patient clinics. Further study 
seems warranted. 
5. 	 High defensiveness/anxiety did not yield smaller 
change scores than d1d low defensiveness/anxiety. 
6. 	 There was an increase in a number of significant 
differences as a function of increased number of 
days 1n the treatment program. There were, how­
ever, no significant differences between FU and 
NFU groups 1n terms of average number of days in 
the program, nor were the mean change scores sig­
nificantly different. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Re'search Diff1cul ties 
There are two major problems with this research in 
terms of interpreting 'the results and coming to any conclu­
sions. The use of attendance at the out-patient clinics as 
a measure of change is the first. The measure does not lack 
validity, it just does not provide enough data on how the 
client is functioning after discharge. Clearly, a more com­
prehensive follow-up would be useful and should include 
further testing of the client's risk-taking propensities. 
The second problem involves the use of the same instrument 
to derive the three different measures of risk taking. 
Other research in this area would want to use measures of 
odds, ambiguity and preference for sure bets that are inde­
pendent of each other so as to determine situational and 
personal differences. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
There is need for continued research in three general 
areas. The first is in terms of determining the relation­
ships between the three risk measures in different situa­
tional contexts. For example, are there risk-taking 
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situations which tend to elicit high preferences for extreme 
odds and a low tolerance for ambiguity? 
A second area of research m1ght be to relate the rlsk­
taking attitudes of different groups to one another. For 
example, how does the hospitalized alcoholic's perception of 
risk compare with that of a non drinking out-patient, or 
with that of a "cured" alcoholic? Do alcoholics view risk 
from the same perspective as do depressives, hysterics, 
etc.? Additionally, the relationships of risk taking and 
age are not clear. Why did the thirty-one to fifty year old 
age group change more than the younger and presumably more 
flexible subjects? How do alcoholics compare with social 
drinkers and non drinkers 1n terms of the three measures of 
risk? Would risk-taking attitudes change in different kinds 
of therapeutic situations; for example, behavior modifica­
tion versus gestalt? And if so, in what ways? 
A third area of research might be to compare risk tak­
ing to other kinds of behavior. Specifically, follow-up 
studies where the criteria for change are more comprehensive 
might be done. 
Implications 
If continuing in the therapeutic process is a goal in 
treatment, then, based on the data presented in this study, 
one of the major areas of emphasis suggested would be in 
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giving the client feedback as to whether or not he was 
.changing in the desired direction. It appears that rela­
tively large changes are rewarding by themselves. Small 
changes, however, may require an outside source of rein­
forc~ment in order for the client to feel sufriciently re­
warded. Systems need to be developed whereby the client and 
staff can determine if change has occurred, and if the 
change is perceived as positive by the client and the staff. 
Additionally there needs to be ways of reporting and reward­
ing the new behavior. Development, and especially the 
conduct, of such a program would be no easy task. Such an 
effort would require specifIc goals, specification of be­
havioral criteria, methods of quantification, and most of 
all, time. 
Two other implications can cautiously be drawn from 
the data in terms of models of treatment leading to attend­
ance at out-patient clinics. One is that there seems to be 
a period of time when the alcoholic is potentially 'more sus­
ceptible to change in his risk-taking attitudes and possibly 
to change in a number of other areas. While the middle age 
category changed most, the fifty-one and over category had 
the highest rate of attendance. The youngest group, on the 
other hand, changed least and had the lowest rate of attend­
I. 
ance. It may be that people with drinking problems who are 
relatively young are not ready emotionally to change. For 
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these individuals other forms of therapy may be more effec­
tive. A second implication for treatment is that indivi­
duals who did not remain in treatment for at least three 
weeks were less likely to attend the out-patient clinics. 
Alcoholics are experts at creating emergencies which would 
recommend an early discharge, yet it may be that not remain­
ing in the treatment program for the required length of time 
is prejudicial to successful treatment. 
. 
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APPENDIX A 
CHOICE DILEMMAS PROCEDURE 
OPINION QUESTIONNAIRE 
I 
tlp 
I 
! 
Instruotions. On the following pages, you will find 
a series of situations that are likely to ooour in everyday 
life. The central person in each situation is faced with a 
choice between two alternative courses of action, which we 
m1ght call X and Y. Alternative X is more desirable and 
attractive than alternative Y, but the probability of 
atta1ning or achieving X is less than that of attaining or 
achievtng Y. 
For each s1tuation on the following pages, you will be 
asked to indicate the minimum odds of success you would 
demand before recommending that the more attractive or de­
sirable alternative, X, be chosen. 
Read each situation carefully before giving your judg­
ment. Try to place yourself in the pos1tion of the central 
person in each of the situations. There are twelve situa­
tions in all. Please do not omit any of them. 
has 
1. Mr. A, an electrical engineer, who is married and 
one child, has been working for a large ele~tron1cs 
J 

I 
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corporation since graduating from college five years ago • 
.He is assured of a lifetime Job with a modest~ though ade­
quate salary~ and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. 
On the other hand~ it is very unlikely that his salary will 
increase much before he retires. While attending a conven­
tion, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded 
company which has a highly uncertain future. The new job 
would pay more to start and would offer the possibility of a 
share in the ownership if the company survived the competi­
tion of the larger firms. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. A. Listed below are 
several probabilitl~s or odds of the new company's proving 
flnancial·ly sound. 
Please check the lowe~t probabIlity that you would 
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. A to take 
the new Job. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the company will prove
financIally sound. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the comp~ny will prove
financially sound. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. A should not 
take the new job no matter what the probabilltl~s. 
I I 
I 
2. Mr. B, a 45-year~old accountant, has recently been 
.informed by his physician that he has developed a severe 
heart ailment. The disease would be sufficiently serious to 
force Mr. B to change many of his strongest life habits-­
reducing his work load, drastically changIng his diet, giv­
ing up favorite leisure-time pursuits. The physician 
s~ggests that a delicate medical operation could be attempted 
which, if Buccessful, would completely relieve the heart 
condition. But its success could not be assured, and ~n 
fact, the operation might prove fatal. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. B. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds that the operation will prove 
successful. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for the operation to be performed. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. B should not 
have the operation no matter what the probabili­

ties. 

The chances are 9 in 10 that the operation will be 

a success. 

The chances are 7 in 10 that the operation will be 

a success. 

The chances are 5 in 10 that the operation w1ll be 

a success. 

The chances are 3 in 10 that the operation will be 
a success. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the operation will be 
a success. 
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3. Mr. C, a married man with two children, has a 
-steady job that pays him about $6000 per year. He can 
easily afford the necessities of life, but few of the lUx­
uries. Mr. CIS father, who died recently, carried a $4000 
life insurance policy. Mr. C would like to invest this 
money in stocks. He is well aware of the secure "blue-chip" 
stocks and bonds that would ·pay approxiw~tely 6% on his in­
vestment. On the other hand, Mr. C has heard that the 
stocks of a relatively unknown Company X might double their 
present value if a new product currently in production is 
favorably received by the buying public. However, if the 
product is unfavorably received, the stocks·would decline in 
value. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. C. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds that Company X stocks will 
double their value. 
Please check the lowest probability t~at you would 
consider acceptable for Mr. C to invest in Company X Stocks. 
The chances are 
their value. 
The chances are 
their- yalue. 
The chances are 
their value. 
I The chances areI· their value.I 
The chance~ are 
their value. 
1 in 10 that the stocks will double 
3 in 10 that the stocks will double 
5 in 10 that the stocks will double 
7 in 10 that the stocks will double 
9 in 10 that the stocks will double 
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Place a check here if you think Mr. C should not 
invest in Company X stocks, no matter what th~ 
probabilities. 
4. Mr. D is the captain of College XiS football team. 
Coll~ge X 1s playing its traditional 'rival, College Y, in 
the final game of the season. The game is in its final 
seconds, and Mr. DiS team, College X, is behind in the 
score. Colle~e X has time to run one more play. Mr. D, 
the capta1n, must decide whether it would be best to settle 
for a tie score with a play which would be almost certain to 
work, or on the other hand, should he try a more complicated 
and risky play which could bring victory if i,t succeeded, 
but defeat if not. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. D. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds that the risky play will work. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
cons1der acceptable for the risky play to be attempted. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. D should not 
attempt the risky play no matter what the proba­

bIlIties. 

The chances are 9 in 10 that the risky play will 

work. 

The chances are 7 in 10 that the risky play will 

'Work. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the risky play will 
work. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the risky play will 
work. 
The chances are 1 1n 10 that the risky play will 
work. 
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5. Mr. E is president of a light metals corporation 
in the United States. The corporation is quite prosperous, 
and has strongly considered the possib1lities of business 
expansion by building an add1tional plant in a new location • 
. The choice is between building another plant in the U.S., 
where there would be a moderate return on the initial in­
vestment, or building a plant in a foreign country. Lower 
labor costs and easy access to raw materials 1n that coun­
try would mean a much higher return on the initial 1nvest­
ment. On the other hand, there is a history of polit1cal 
instability and revolution in the foreign country under con­
sideration. In fact, the leader of a small minority party 
1s committed to nationalizing, that is, taking over, all 
foreign investments. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. E. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds of continued political sta­
bility in the foreign country under consideration. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for Mr. Ets corporation to build a plant 
1n that country. 
The chances are 1 1n 10 that the foreign country 

will remain politically stable. 

The chances are 3 in 10 that the foreign country

will remain polit1cally stable. 

The chances are 5 1n 10 that the foreign country

will remain politically stable. 

; 
l' 
I . 
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The chances are 7 in 10 that the foreign country 
will remain politically stable. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the foreign country 
will remain politically stable. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. E's corporation 
should not build a plant in the foreign country, no 
matter what the probabilities. 
6. Mr. F is currently a college senior who 1s very 
eager to pursue graduate study in chemistry leading to the 
Doctor of Philosophy degree. He has been accepted by both 
Un1versity X and University Y. University X has a world­
wide reput.at10n for excellence in chemistry. While a degree 
from University X would signify outstanding training 1n this 
field, the standards are so very rigorous that only a frac­
tion of the degree candidates actually receive the degree. 
Un1versity Y, on the other hand, has much less of a reputa­
tion in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the 
Doctor of Philosophy degree, though the degree has much less 
prestige than the eorresponding degree from University X. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded a 
degree at University X, the one with the greater prestige. 
Please check the lowest probability that you woul.d 
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr'. F to enroll 
1n University X rather than University Y. 
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Place a check here if you think Mr. F should not 
enroll in University X, no matter what the proba­
bilities. 
I
, l 
, I 
i 
The chances are 9 1n 10 that Mr. 
degree from University X. 
F w.ould receive a 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr 
degree from University X. 
F would receive a 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. 
degree from University X. 
F would receive a 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. 
degree from University X. 
F would receive a 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. 
degree from University X. 
F would receive a 
7. Mr. G, a competent chess player, is participating 
in a national chess tournament. In an early match he draws 
the top-favored player in the tournament as his opponent. 
Mr. G has been given a relatively low ranking in view of his 
performance in previous tournaments. During the course, of 
his play with the top-favored man, Mr. G notes the possibi­
l1ty of a deceptive though risky maneuver which might bring 
him a quick victory. At the same time, if the attempted' 
maneuver should fail, Mr. G would be left 1n an exposed 
position and defeat would almost certainly follow • 
. ' . 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. G. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds that MI~. GiS deceptive play 
would succeed. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider aCQ,~ptable for the risky play 1n question to be 
attempted. 
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The chances are 1 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
The chances are'7 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the play would succeed. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. G should not 
attempt the risky play, no matter what the proba-	 I 
bilities. 	 I 
I8. Mr. H, a college senior, has studied the piano i 
since childhood. He has won amateur prizes and given small I 
!
reci tala, ,suggesting that Mr. H has considerable musical I 
Italent. As graduation approaches, Mr. H has the choice of 
going to medical school to become a phYSician, a profession i 
which would bring certain prestige and financial rewardsj or I I 
! 
entering a conservatory of music for aqvanced training with 	 ! 
i 
l j 
a well-known pianist. Mr. H realizes that even upon comple­ ! 

tion of his piano studies, which would take many more years 

and a lot of money, success as a concert pianist would not 

be assured. 

Imagine that you are advising Mr. H. Listed bel.ow are 
several probabilities or odds that Mr. H would succeed as a 
concert p1anist. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for Mr. H to continue with his musical 
training. 
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Place a check here if you think Mr. H should not 
pursue his musical training, no matter what tne­
probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as 
a concert pianist. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that· Mr. H would succeed as 
a concert pianist. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as 
a concert pianist. 
The. chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as 
a concert pianist. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. H would succeed as 
a concert pianist. 
9. Mr. J is an American captured by the enemy in 
World War II and placed in a prisoner-of-war camp. Condi­
tions in the camp are quite bad, with long hours of hard 
physical labor and a barely sufficient diet. After spending 
several months in this camp,. Mr. J notes the possibility of 
escape by concealing himself in a supply truck that shuttles 
in and out of the camp. Of course, there is no guarantee 
that the escape would prove successful. Recapture by the 
enemy could well mean execution. 
ImagIne that you are advising Mr. J. Listed below are 
several probabilities or odds of a successful escape from 
the prisoner-of-war camp. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for an escape to be attempted. 
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The chances are 1 in 10 that the escape would 
succeed. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the escape would 
succeed. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that" the escape would 
succeed. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the escape would 
succeed. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the escape would 
succeed. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. J should not 
try to escape no matter what the probabilitieS:­
10. Mr. K is a successful businessman who has parti­
cipated in a number of civic activities of considerable 
value to the community. Mr. K has been approached by the 
leaders of h~s political party as a possible congressional 
candidate in the next election. Mr. Kls party is a minority 
party in the district, though the party has won occasional 
. elections in the past. Mr. K would like to hold political 
office, but to do so would involve a serious financial sac­
rifice, since the party has insufficient campaign funds. He 
would also have to endure the attacks of his political 0ppo­
nents in a hot campaign. 
Imagine that you are advising Mr. K. List~d below are 
several probabilities or odds of Mr. KIs winning the elec­
tion 1n his district. 
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Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for Mr. K to run 
for political office. 
Pl'ace a check here if you think Mr. K should not 
run for political office no matter what the proba­
bilities. 
-The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr K would win the 
election. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. K would win the 
election. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. K would win the 
election. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. K would win the 
election. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr K would win the 
election. 
11. Mr. L, a married 30-year~old research physicist, 
has been given a five-year appointm"ent by a major university 
laboratory. As he contemplates the next five years, he 
realizes that he might work on a difficult, long-term prC?b­
lem which, 1f a solution could be found, would resolve basic 
"scientlfic 	issues in the field and bring high scientific 
honors. If no solution were found, however, Mr. L would 
have little to show for his five years in the laboratory, 
and this would make it hard for him to get a good job after­
wards. On the other hand, he could, as most of his profes­
s10nal associates are dOing, work on a ser1es of short-term 
problems where solutions would be easier to find, but where 
the problems are of lesser scientific importance. 
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Imagine that you are advising Mr. L. Listed below are 
.several probabilities or odds that a solution would be found 
to the difficult, long-term problem that Mr. L has 1n mind. 
Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable to make it worthwhile for' Mr. L to work 
on the more difficult long-term problem. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. 
long-term problem. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. 
long-term problem. 
The chances are 5 in '10 that Mr. 
long-term problem • 
..
. 	 The chances are 7 in 10 that Mr. 
long-term problem. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. 
long-term problem. 
L would solve the 
L would solve the 
L would solve the 
L would solve the 
L would solve the 
Place a check here if you think Mr. L should not 
choose the 	long-term, difficult problem, no matter 
what the probabilities. 
I 
I 	 12. Mr. M 1s contemplating marriage to Miss T, a girl 
1 
1· 
I 	
whom he has known for a little more than a year. Recently, 
however, a number of arguments have occurred between them,I. 
suggesting some sharp differences of opinion in the way each 
views certain matters. Indeed, they decide to seek profes­
slonal advice from a marriage counselor as to whether it 
would be wise for them to marry. On the basis of these 
meetings with a marriage counselor, they realize that a happy 
marriage, while possible, would not be assured. 
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Imagine that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T. 
L1sted below are several probabilities or odds that their 
marriage would prove to b~ a happy and successful one. 
,- Please check the lowest probability that you would 
consider acceptable for Mr. "M and Miss T to get married. 
Place a check here if you think Mr. Mand Miss T 
should not marry, no matter what the probabilities. 
The chances are 9 in 10 that the marriage would be 
happy and successful. 
The chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage would be 
happy and successful. 
The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriage would be 
-happy and successful. 
The chances are 3 in 10 that the marriage would be 
happy and successful. 
The chances are 1 in 10 that the mar'riage would be 
happy and successful. 
I 
t ­
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